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Georgia Historical Society 

Vol. VII 






Published by 

The Georgia Historical Society 

Savannah, Ga. 

Savannah, Ga. 

Savannah Morning News 



The translation that follows was made from manuscripts 
in the library of Mr. W. J. DeRenne, copied from the origi- 
nal documents preserved in the Archives of the Indies at 
Seville. Each of these manuscripts bears a heading giving 
the provenance of its original, and each is further certified 
as being a true copy. Heading and certificate are reproduc- 
ed with the first document of the translation, but it has not 
been thought worth while to repeat them with the remain- 

The papers of this collection fall more or less naturally 
into groups : — Letters and orders, diaries, reports and re- 
turns. The list of sea- and shore-signals, and one set of 
naval instructions, have with the returns been placed last 
as being somewhat detached, logically, from the substance 
of the other papers. They have their significance and in- 
terest, however, in that they reveal the extreme care be- 
stowed on the expedition. It will be noticed that the list 
of signals and the set of naval instructions relate to an 
earlier expedition, planned but not carried out. 

The sketches of guns and mortars are due to Lieutenant 
J. W. Lang, 9th Regiment of Infantry, United States Army. 
They are reproduced from illustrations in the catalogue of 
the Artillery Museum at Madrid. 

The Treaty of Vienna, November 18, 1738, gave Spain 
but a short respite from war. Claims and counterclaims 
arising chiefly out of colonial questions, led to much diplo- 
matic parleying with England, and in January, 1739, she 
saw herself obliged to pay that country an indemnity of 
£95,000. On the presentation of a demand for a counter- 
indemnity, England threatened war ; on August 20th au- 
thorized reprisals, and finally on October 30, 1739, declared 
war. It is of this war, terminated b}^ the Treaty of Aix-la- 
Chapelle, October 18, 1718, that the events of the following 
pages form a part. 

War or no war, the Spanish had long been contemplating 
an expedition against the English Colony of Georgia. 
They kept such an expedition on the stocks, as it were, to 

be launched when opportune; and finally did launch it in 
June of 1742 to overwhelm the English King's new Colony 
"in the place called Georgia." To the King of Spain, and to 
his subjects in Cuba and Florida, the chief object was puni- 
tive : the insolent and perfidious English were to be chas- 
tised and the chastisement was to be extermination. There 
was no notion of conquest; once the object attained and the 
English swept off the face of the earth, troops and ships 
were to return to their respective garrisons in St. Augus- 
tine and Havana. So much stress, indeed, was laid on this 
withdrawal as to justify the belief that its accomplishment 
was almost as much a matter of concern as the advance it- 
self. This concern undeniably affected the morale of the 
commanding general, if not of the entire expedition. 

In forming an estimate of the events dealt with in the 
following pages, it is needful to place one's self in a proper 
point of view. If we place ourselves abroad, the events are 
inconspicuous; if we recross the Atlantic, they loom large. 
In reality, we must not regard the attempt of Spain on 
New Georgia as an affair between small numbers in a dis- 
tant and unimportant land ; it was Spain and England striv- 
ing for mastery in a vast continent, and although Spain, as 
already said, had no notion of conquest, to England, that is 
to Oglethorpe, the notion of permanency was ever present 
and fundamentally real. To him the question was whether 
his beloved Georgia should be a Spanish waste, or a living, 
free, English colony, a potential State. How he answered 
this question we all know: he brought to naught as grave 
a danger as ever threatened the Colonies, and he did it 

The point of view must needs then be local, but with a 
national outlook ; it follows that the papers in this collec- 
tion acquire a double interest. And this interest grows 
with the conviction, begot of an examination of the records, 
that Oglethorpe- by all the rules of the game, should have 
been beaten. He was out-manned, out-shipped, and out- 
gunned. But he was a soldier, and knew his business; al- 
though men, and ships, and guns are necessary, alone they 
are not sufficient. They must first be welded into a homo- 
geneous instrument and then intelligently used, before pos- 
itive results can be expected. This homogeneity was lack- 
ing to his adversaries, a fact that he must have been ac- 
quainted with ; moreover, they had not had time to know 
their commander, Montiano, nor he his troops. And lastly,, 
it is in the highest degree probable that Oglethorpe had, 
measured his antagonist. 

That Montiano had failed to take his own measure, is 
proved by his pitiable report to his King. Without in the 
least intending- it, in complete unconsciousness, he strips 
his own inefficiency bare for our inspection and examina- 
tion. Psychologically, conditions were against the Span- 
iards from the outset, but this must not in the least be taken 
to detract from Oglethorpe : he had to reckon on the one 
hand with a force much greater than any he could muster, 
and on the other hand, with certain possibilities in his favor; 
but in respect of these he might very easily have been in 

The Spaniards sailed into St. Simons gallantly enough, 
and landed their men between the forts and the town of 
Frederica. No resistance was offered. Bearing in mind 
that a landing under fire is, for the landing party, a delicate 
operation, we may well ask why Oglethorpe should have 
neglected this opportunity to do his adversary a serious 
harm. But a little reflection will show that this case really 
offered no opportunity. As soon as it became evident that 
the run-past of the ships was, or would be, successful, the 
evacuation of the forts was imposed. To leave troops in 
the forts, even if they could have held out, was folly so 
clear that we need waste no time over the matter. But 
once withdrawn, where should they go? Should they pro- 
ceed to resist this disembarkation, either alone, or in junc 
tion with other forces brought down for the purpose? 

But Oglethorpe could not tell where the Spaniards would 
land : it was not inconceivable that they would deliver their 
first attack on the town itself. If, however, they should 
choose to land between the town and the forts, then it was 
the part of wisdom to leave them to follow this course ; for 
once ashore, they would have miles of swamp to cross be- 
fore reaching him, and his inferiority in numbers would be 
more than compensated by the advantage of positions se- 
lected in advance. If he had attempted to oppose this land- 
ing, he would have had the morasses at his back, and so in 
case of check, have converted an admirable natural defence 
into a most serious obstacle to successful withdrawal. 
Moreover, so few were his men that he could not afford 
to divide them ; and lastly, and quite apart from any other 
consideration, he had no guns to oppose to the Spanish 
naval artillery, against which any musketry fire that he 
could bring to bear, ineffective in those days beyond two 
hundred 3-ards, would have been powerless. 

The issue proved the wisdom of his dispositions. The 
first attempt of the Spaniards to push their way through the 
morasses was also their last, nor did they later make any 

effort of any other sort. This failure to undertake any- 
thing more must be regarded as discreditable to the "glory 
and reputation of the arms of the King," particularly if the 
Spanish account of losses be correct. That it is not, we 
know from other sources. Indeed, so great were Montia- 
no's losses, and among his best troops, so sudden and un- 
expected his check, so uncompromising his defeat, that the 
matter was really then and there settled. In plain English, 
he had no stomach for further business. After that disas- 
trous beating when his grenadiers fell only to incarnadine the 
waters of the swamp in which they were entrapped, he sent 
out only Indians to see "if they could find some other road 
to Frederica". Meanwhile his rations were being reduced, 
he had not got his guns ashore, and rumors unnerved him. 
In these straits he fell to calling councils of war and so was 
lost. That he had made only one genuine effort to reach 
his objective, that in spite of the failure of this effort, he 
still outnumbered Oglethorpe, that in any case his fleet was 
substantially intact, these things made no impression on 
him. His one concern was to withdraw. And yet so blind 
was he to his own shortcomings that he attributes his fail- 
ure to the Almighty and actually asks his King to approve 
his conduct of affairs and to bestow honors upon him. To 
be sure, he had razed a few earthworks evacuated by their 
garrisons, carried off a few guns spiked by the enemy, 
Ijurned a few houses abandoned by the inhabitants. And 
here we m.ay now well leave him, recounting his victories 
over inanimate things, and glossing his failure, for this fail- 
ure made the State of Georgia possible. 

C. DeW. W. 
West Point, New York, October 19, 1912. 

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Report Upon the Expulsion of the English from the Territories 
They Have Usurped in Florida, and Survey of Limits and 
Incidences. From 173S to 1743; Case 87, Drawer 1, File 3. 

Affidavit of Juan Castelnau, a Prisoner in Georgia, 

Havana, July 24, 1739.* 
Don Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas transmits 
the depositions made by Juan Castelnau, a native of Los 
Pasages in Guipiizcoa, on the present state of the Settle- 
ments of New Georgia, where he was held a prisoner for 18 
months, and of its fortifications, forces and establishments. 

Sir: Juan Castelnau, who says he is a native of Los Pas- 
ages in Guipiizcoa, having come from Cartagena in this dis- 
patch boat nov/ on her vv'ay to those kingdoms [i, e. Castile 
and Leon, or Spain] with the order and permission consist- 
ing in a decree petitioned for by him of Lieutenant General 
Don Bias de Lesso, I have taken the declarations that follow 
to substantiate the reasons he gave to obtain the said per- 
mission. As I find from them that he has told the truth, and 
given an exact account and trustworthy news of the state of 
the towns of New Georgia, its fortifications, forces and es- 
tablishments, both as these were at the time of the expedi- 
tion intended and planned for the past year of 1738, and 
as they were after the arrival of the Commanding General 
Don Diego Ogletop,** I have thought it proper to send your 
Lordship the testimony of his declarations, to the end that 
His Majesty maj'" be thoroughly informed of past and pres- 
ent conditions, because it agrees with all the inquiries and 
news which I had made and acquired for the expedition, 
and with those of the Governor of Saint Augustine in 

•It should be recollected that these dates are Gregorian; those of the 
contemporaneous English accounts are Julian. The difference, as is weU 
known, was at this epoch, eleven days. 

** Oglethorpe's name has in all cases, been left exactly as the Spaniards 
wrote it. 


Florida, made after the return of Don Diego Ogletorp to 
those Colonies. 

God keep your Lordship many years. 

Havana, July 24, 1739. 
Your most obedient servant kisses your hand. 
Don Juan Francisco de Guemes 3'- Horcasitas. 

To Seuor Don Joseph de la Quintana. 


In the city of Havana, on the 18th day of July, 1739, Don 
Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas, Field Marshal of 
the Armies of His Majesty, his Governor and Captain Gen- 
eral over the said city and of the Island of Cuba, said: — 
That the day before yesterday, the 16th of the current 
month, there came into this port [Havana] from that of 
Cartagena of the Indies, the dispatch frigate on her way to 
the kingdom of Castile and aboard of her, Juan Castelnau, 
a native of Los Pasages in the Province of Guiptizcoa, who 
was for 18 months a prisoner in New Georgia and other 
settlements, which the English have occupied ; and that up- 
on his liberation, he succeeded in passing through Virginia 
and other parts to the city of Santo Domingo in the island 
of Hispaniola, and thence to Cartagena aforesaid. Here 
he presented himself to His Excellency Don Bias de Leso,* 
Lieutenant General of His Majesty's fleets, Commander of 
the Galleons there stationed, and of all the naval forces in 
America, who upon request ordered him to proceed here 
in the dispatch frigate. In order now to possess ourselves 
of all that he has seen, surveyed, and understood, let him 
appear forthwith, and under oath, clearly and distinctly 
set forth the matter, according to the questions that may 
be made to him. And by these presents, I so provide, com- 
mand and sign. 


Before me, Miguel de Ayala, 

Chief Clerk, State and War. 

* Leso, or Lezo, is mentioned by Altamira (Historia de Espana, Vol. IV., 
p. 194) as one of the celebrated Spanish seamen of the time. 


Declaration of Juan Castelnau. 

His Lordship, the Governor and Captain General imme- 
diately caused Juan Castelnau, a native of Los Pasages, to 
appear before him, who being sworn before God and on the 
Cross according to law, promised in consequence to tell the 
truth, whereupon the following questions were put to him ; 

Asked why he had come to this place in the dispatch 
boat that had anchored in its port, the 16th instant, on its 
way from Cartagena to Spain, he said, that finding himself 
in Cartegena, he had asked permission of His Excellency 
Don Bias de Leso, Lieutenant General of the Fleets of His 
Majesty, Commander of the Galleons in that port, and of 
all the naval forces in America, to go to Havana and make 
report to His Lordship of the state of the Colonies of New 
Georgia in which the English had kept him a prisoner for 
18 months, as appears from the petition which he presented 
to the said Don Bias de Leso and from his decree in evi- 
dence. Asked why and when he had been apprehended by 
the English of the Colonies of New Georgia, where he de- 
clared he had been, he ansAvered that it was because they 
took him for a spy of Spain, and that it was in the beginning 
of the year 1737 on passing from Florida to Carolina, when 
he was examined by two tribunals; that after two months 
of confinement on account of said suspicion, the tribunals 
finding him guiltless, had enlarged him. 

Asked how he had passed from Florida to Carolina, and 
for what reason he was in Florida, he said he had gone 
from Pensacola, where he had assisted the paymaster of 
that post, to Florida with the idea of crossing Carolina on 
his way to Europe in order to return to his own country, 
and that to that end he had received authority from the 
Governor of Saint Augustine in Florida, who was then Don 
Francisco del Moral Sanchez, to make a journey through 

Asked where he had been after being set at liberty in 
Carolina, as declared by him. and for how long, he answer- 
ed that returning to Florida for the purpose of seeing if he 
could not earn some money on account of having spent and 
consumed that which he had before while a prisoner in 
Carolina, he had embarked in a pirogue at Port Royal and 
arrived at Savannah, a town which they said was the cap- 
ital of New Georgia, through fear of falling in with the 
English commanding officers of the other ports. He put 
to sea with the master of the said pirogue, and bad weather 


coming on, they were driven in and compelled to save their 
lives by going ashore on an island called Emilia, whence 
a guard of four Englishmen there stationed took him to 
Saint Simon's. Here had his residence a commanding of- 
ficer called Captain Gasquin, who, after enquiring into the 
reasons which had brought him thither put him aboard the 
manual or coast guard vessel of the place, invariably forbid- 
ding him to communicate with whatever Spanish vessel 
might be in those waters, until the Commander Don Diego 
Obletor having arrived from London, he recovered his 

Asked in what manner he had proceeded from those parts 
to Cartagena, he said that Don Diego Obletor had assisted 
him to embark in a ship sailing to Virginia, whence he had 
gone by land to Mallorca.* Here he embarked in a bilan- 
der bound for the French coast of San Domingo, and having 
arrived, he betook himself to the city, and made report to 
the President of all that had befallen him ; and the Presi- 
dent after taking his declaration, had sent him on to Car- 
tagena, to Don Bias de Leso. 

Asked if he had been able to learn anything of the posts 
occupied by the English in those parts, of what strength 
they were and how fortified before the coming out of the 
Commander Don Diego Obletor, he answered that he had, 
that the established posts were Savannah or New Georgia,** 
containing some 200 houses of wood, very far each from the 
other, for which reason they take up much room ; the town 
situated on a bank of the river of the same name, on a bluff 
forty feet high with a battery of 10 pieces, about 8-pound- 
ers, without any garrison whatever, the service of the bat- 
tery being undertaken by the citizens themselves ; that only 
the area surrounding the battery is inclosed by a stockade 
of pine logs about 18 feet high and one foot thick, and that 
the rest of the settlement is open ; that at the mouth of the 
river stood a tower of wood constructed both as a lookout 

•Evidently New York; elsewhere in tliese papers we have Noynrra ; the 
scribe could readily write AfaUorcii, with which name he was acquainted, for 
JVoyorca, of which he liad probably never heard before. 

•* It will be remarked that to the affiant, Savannah and New Georgia 
mean the same thinpr. Similarly, in the papers that follow, Florida is fre- 
quently vspd where we should write Faint Augrustine. Fometimes the con- 
text enables us to distinguish between the chief town and the Colony, some- 
times it does not. Thus, when Horcasitas tells Montiano "to raze and destroy 
Carolina and its plantations," he may mean Charleston and surrounding 
plantations, or the Colony, though the former is perhaps the more likely. 
Where no doubt can exist, the name of the town has been given in the trans- 
lation. In other cases the MS. has been followed. 

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This plan reproduced from the oiisinal in tlio 
possession of W. J. DeKiniie, Wonisloe, (in,. 

[The Horizontal Scale of this Reproduction is one inch— 450 feet, very nearly] 


and as a beacon for that port, which the English call Tebi, 
and we Criices. And farther to the south lies the Island 
of Saint Simon, before reaching which there is another fort 
facing the Island of Santa Cathalina which they call Darien, 
garrisoned by about thirty Scotchmen, and mounting six 
guns of the same calibre. That in the aforementioned is- 
land [of Saint Simon] there is a town called Frederica sit- 
uated on the bank of the river Saint Simon, and said to 
contain thirty or forty houses or huts of boards and palm 
leaves, with another battery also of ten guns of the said* 
caliber, without any troops for its service, the citizens act- 
ing as guard. South of this tov/n, say a league and a half, 
is a careening ground with three or four houses of boards, 
and on the point on the south of the island they have con- 
structed a battery of sixteen guns of the same calibre to 
sweep the entrance of the Harbor of Gualquini, which the 
English call Fort Frederica, beneath whose guns lay the 
manual in which he was a prisoner. Continuing further 
south, on the Point of Bejecez, on the Isle of Whales stands 
a fort which they called Saint Andrew with sixteen or 
twenty men commanded by Captain Makay, mounting ten 
guns of the same calibre. Still farther south yet is the Is- 
land of Emilia which we Spaniards call San Pedro, where 
they keep four men as a lookout, and have one gun and a 
stone mortar. That these were at the time in question the 
settlements, fortifications and forces which they had. He 
was further of the opinion that all the settlers to be found 
m.ight number three hundred men, all of whom were capa- 
ble of bearing arms. 

Asked on what date he set forth from those Colonies to 
go to Virginia, when the Commander Don Diego Obletor 
arrived, and what troops he brought with him, he answered, 
that he himself set out on Nov. 4, 1738, of the past year, and 
that the Commander Don Diego Obletor arrived in the pre- 
ceding September of the same year with five transports and 
one vessel mounting more than twenty-two guns, and said 
to be a warship called the Blandfort, and that in the said 
transports he had brought over about five hundred men 
and more according to appearances, said to be regular 
troops ; that in the month of July of said year, Lieutenant 
Colonel Cocran had arrived from Gibraltar with three hun- 
dred men drawn from its garrison, that after the arrival 

• 1. e. said of the battery at Savannah. 


of the Commander Obletor there came an English packet 
boat loaded solely with artillery and implements of war; 
that the troops mentioned were distributed, six hundred 
men in the Isle of Saint Simon in Fort Frederica, and two 
hundred in Saint Andrew; and that at the same time when 
the five hundred came with the Commander Obletor, came 
also two hundred women with them, the purpose being to 
compel the soldiers to marry them. 

Asked if after the arrival of all these people, and while 
he A^as still in those parts, he had seen or learned whether 
they were making new fortifications or occupying other 
posts or laying out new settlements, or whether he detect- 
ed any especial design of the Commander Obletor, he said 
that he saw them tracing out under the direction of a French 
engineer they had brought out, a castle in the fort at Fred- 
erica, and for this purpose had collected a supply of bricks 
and timber in the same Isle of Saint Simon between the 
town and the careening ground ; that with the same engin- 
eer they were taking soundings on the bar and in the chan- 
nel ; that they were building two other small forts to com- 
mand the land approaches from Florida to Georgia so as to 
guard against any surprise by Spanish Indians ; that each 
one was occupied by a corporal and 20 settlers, that one of 
these [forts] was called Fort Augustus, but he had forgot- 
ten the name of the other; that they had not laid out any 
new settlements; that he had [not]* detected any especial 
design on the part of Commander Obletor, but that he had 
heard the officers say that the design in view was to take 
possession of Saint Augustine in Florida, and had remarked 
that in case the outbreak of war was doubtful they had 
made certain arrangements looking to this end. 

Asked what number of Indians they had under allegiance 
in those parts, where they were situated, and to what use 
they were put, he said it seemed to him there were about 
200 kept in two towns, one immediately adjacent to New 
Georgia, in which they had set up a school for the children, 
and the other must be at Darien; that they were to be used 
to commit hostilities on the Spaniards and that he had 
strong proof of this ; for while he, the declarant, was there, 
the Governor of Saint Augustine in Florida had the year 
before in 1738 written to Captain Gasquin for satisfaction 
by punishing some Indians guilty of homicide, and that 

• The context shows that the negative particle has been through error 


he had seen the same Indians on their return from this af- 
fair regaled by him with aguardiente and other things, and 
told that whenever they brought in Spanish scalps they 
would be rewarded, and that he had this from a nephew of 

Asked if a town of Esquisaros which is called Surisbu,* 
on the bank of the Savannah, adjoining Port Royal due 
west, is well advanced, and populous, he said that this town 
is now abandoned and demolished, and that its inhabitants 
had gone, part to Port Royal, and others to New Georgia, 
and that only a few plantations had been left. 

Asked the population of Port Royal, what fortifications 
it had, if the anchoring ground is good, and whence come 
the ships that may anchor there, he said that Port Royal 
might contain 40 or 50 houses, but that the country is well 
filled with plantations as far as Saint George, worked by 
many negroes ; that there is a fort called Vinfort at half a 
league from Port Royal to guard the entrance of the port, 
square of trace, with 4 curtains and bastions, made of tim- 
ber, earth and oyster shell, and that he had heard they were 
adding some sort of outwork; that the anchoring ground 
of the Port is the best of the entire Province of Carolina, 
but that in the entrance there is not sufficient depth for ves- 
sels of greater burden than that corresponding to 24 or 30 
guns at the most. 

Asked what harvests they had in New Georgia, and what 
products were most highly prized, he said that corn, rice, 
beans, squashes and other vegetables were planted ; that the 
product most prized was silk, that consequently they had 
planted mulberry trees, and that they continually displayed 
more and more ardor in this matter. 

Asked what kind of boats they had and how many in 
those rivers, for communicating one port with another, he 
said that each port had a pirogue with a swivel-gunf in the 
bow; and that besides, they had two or three canoes, in 
which they carried supplies back and forth, but that 4 or 5 
individuals had their own boats. 

Asked what was the purpose of the packet boat under 
the orders of Captain Gasquin, and what port it served 

• PuiTsburg. 

t Pedrero in MS.. This word means (a) swivel-gnn; (b) small gun; 
(c) stone-mortar. Usually there is nothing in the texts that follow to 
indicate which is meant. The word is frequently used, and except that the 
meaning "swivel-gun" is probably correct aboard ship, ashore the context 
throws no light on the point. 


with the greatest frequency, he said that while he was there,, 
it set out thrice to cruise along- the coasts of the jurisdiction, 
and that during the winter it lay in the port of Gualquini 
in the river of Saint Simon, and added that he had seen as 
many as twenty pounds of silk made there and of good qual- 
ity. He affirms that his declaration made under oath is the 
truth ; that he is forty years of age ; and signed his declara- 
tion, to which His Lordship appended his flourish. 

Juan Castelnau. 
Before me, Miguel de Ayala, 

Chief Clerk, State and War. 

Petition of Juan Castelnau. 


Most Excellent Sir: Juan Castelnau, a native of los Pas- 
ajes in the Province of Guipuzcoa, kneeling in full devotion 
at the feet of your Lordship, says that he was captured in 
New Georgia, where the English held him a prisoner for 
18 months, and proceeded to the Island of San Domingo in 
an English sloop, in order to describe to His Majesty's rep- 
resentatives the state and conditions of the English in that 
Colony. After having made the proper declaration before 
the President of San Domingo, he was sent to this port 
[Cartagena] in a bilander chartered for the purpose b}^ the 
said President, in order to inform your Lordship of all mat- 
ters (as he has done). Desiring now to go on to Havana 
to inform his Lordship the Governor of that position, should 
it be necessary, of the state of the Colonies of New Georgia, 
and to repair his needs by the help of a few friends whom 
he has in that city, he humbh' supplicates your Lord- 
ship to grant him authority to take passage in this dispatch 
boat for the said city of Havana ; and to order its Captain 
to transport him v/ithout any cost whatever, a favor he 
hopes to receive from the compassion of your Lordship. 

Cartagena, June 22, 1739. 

Tuan Castelnau. 



Decree. Cartagena, June 23, 1739. 

Seeing that all the allegations of this person, as set forth 
in this petition, are true, he is granted permission to go in 
this dispatch boat to the port of Havana, in case it be im- 
portant to advise the Governor of that position of all that 
this person has seen and declared. And the Captain of this 
dispatch boat will transport him without any cost to the 
said port of Havana. 


A true copy of the originals in my keeping, to which I 
refer. By oral order of the Governor and Captain General 
of this Fortress and Island, I give these presents for de- 
livery to his Lordship, written on eight sheets with this 
one, at Havana, July 21, 1739. I afnx my seal [there is a 
seal] in v/itness of the truth. 

Misfucl de Avala. 

We certify that Don ]\Iiguel de Ayala, by whom these 
affidavits are sealed and signed, is, by royal appointment, a 
Chief Clerk, State and War, in this city of Havana and 
Island of Cuba, is faithful, loyal and trustw^orthy, and as 
such practices his profession, and receives full faith and 

Havana, July 21, 1739. 

Christoval Leal, Notary Public (his flourish).* 
Antonio Ponce de Leon, Royal Notary (his flourish). 
Tomas de Salas y Castro, Royal Notary (his flourish). 

True copy of the original preserved in these General 
Archives of the Indies, Case 87, Drawer 1, File 3. 
Seville, July 6, 1906. 

(Signed) Pedro Torres Lanzas, 

Head Keeper of Archives. 

* The riihrica, or flourish is what gives validity to a Spanish signature. 
In some cases, the rubrica is used alone, without the name of its maker. 







St. Augustine, August 20, 1739. 

The Governor, Don Manuel de Montiano, says : 

That in order more clearly to justify the right of Your 
Majesty to the colonies occupied by the English, it has 
seemed proper to him to enclose a map of these colonies, 
based on the information received from different persons 
well acquainted with the country and who have a thorough 
knowledge of the bars, ports, rivers and roads therein, hav- 
ing trafficked over them, so that having a better knowl- 
edge of these territories and of their situation, the proper 
measures may be taken. 

He says further that as appears from these maps, the 
English have occupied the best bars and the deepest ports 
capable of sheltering sea-going ships of large size ; such as 
the bar of St. Helens ; that of Santa Cruz ; that of St. Simon ; 
that of Gualquini; that of the [Bay of] Whales and others 
of less depth, a thing which Your Majesty does not pos- 
sess on this entire coast running north and south because 
the bar of St. Augustine has a depth of only seventeen 

He also declares that the River St. Isabel is navigable 
to within two days' journey of the towns of the Uchee In- 
dians in the provinces of Apalache and that the English 
having craftily occupied them, may now come down as far 
as the coasts of the Gulf of Mexico and occupy on it some 
port, such as that of St. Joseph, Pensacola or others. The 
consequences of this action would be most fatal to the com- 
merce of our galleons and fleets ; and he proposes, in order 
to prevent this, the occupation of the said Bay of St. Joseph, 
and that a strenuous effort be made to bring about the 
evacuation by the English of all the territory from New 
Georgia toward the south with the Bar of St. Helens ; and 
that whatever territories be left them, limits should be 
marked out on a line running southeast and northwest, 
taking from them as many as possible of the towns of the 


Uchee Indians and as much as possible of the coast of the 
Gulf of Mexico. This done, we should succeed in depriv- 
ing them of all hope for their projects and in holding our- 
selves ports on that coast, in which our ships and fleets 
could shelter themselves whenever accident or misfortune 
should overtake them. 

I The Letter ] 

As a result of the remission to Your Majest)^ of the docu- 
ments which I have been able to find in the archives of this 
place [St. Augustine], justifying the right and title of Your 
Majesty to the colonies illegally occupied by the English, 
it has appeared to me proper to add a map of these Colo- 
nies, based on the information brought in by different peo- 
ple well acquainted with the country and thoroughly in- 
formed in respect of the bars, harbors, rivers and roads by 
reason of having trafficked over them, so that having a full 
knowledge of those territories and their situation. Your 
Majesty may take such measures as may seem suitable. 
And as I conceive it to be a part of my duty to present to 
Your Majesty whatever I take to be beneficial to the ro3^al 
service and to the protection of the royal dominions, I beg 
leave to set forth to Your Majesty that according to the 
map, the English have occupied the best harbors and the 
deepest ports, able to shelter vessels of deep draft, such as 
the Bar of St. Helens, that of Santa Cruz, that of St. Si- 
mon, that of Gualquini, that of the Bay of Whales, and 
others of less depth; and that Your Majesty, in all the royal 
possessions of this coast from north to south, owns nothing 
like these, because this port of St. Augustine has a depth 
of only seventeen palms. At the same time, I must in- 
form Your Majesty that the River St. Isabel is a naviga- 
ble one to within two days' journey of the Uchee Indians 
in the province of Apalache; and that the English have 
occupied them by craft and cunning, so that they can de- 
scend to the coasts of the Gulf of Mexico and occupy on 
them some port like that of St. Joseph, Pensacola or oth- 
ers, the consequences of which would be most serious for 
the commerce of the galleons and the fleets of Your Majes- 
ty. In order that this may not happen, I make bold to pro- 
pose to Your Majesty the propriety of occupying the said 
Bay of St. Joseph and that the whole effort of Your Majesty 
should be bent on dislodging the English from New- 
Georgia toward the south, including the Bar of St. Helens 


and that whatever territories be left to them, their limits 
should be marked out along a line southeast northwest, 
taking from them as many as possible of the Uchee towns 
and those of the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. This would 
result in depriving them of all hope of carrying out their 
projects on the Gulf of Mexico and in furnish'ng Your 
ivlajesty harbors on the said coast in which ships, in case 
of misfortune, may take shelter. 

God keep the Catholic Royal Person of Your Majesty, 
many happy years, as demanded by Christendom. 

St. Augustine in Florida, Aug. 20, 1739. 

(Sgd) Don Manuel de Montiano. 
(A Flourish) 
[ Answer ] 

In a letter of the 20th of August, Your Lordship has en- 
closed in greater justification of the right of His Majesty to 
the Colonies occupied by the English in those provinces, 
a map of these Colonies, based on the information given 
to Your Lordship by different persons v/ell acciuarated with 
the country and having full knowledge of the bars, ports, 
rivers and roads, by reason of having trafficked over them 
to the end that having a full knowledge of circumstances, 
suitable measures might be taken. These matters, having 
been laid before His Majesty, he is informed of the subject 
and of the especial exposition v/hich Your Lordship makes 
at the same time, to the effect that it would be proper to 
occupy the Bay of St. Joseph and apply all our energies 
to dislodge the English from New Georgia toward the south, 
including the Bar of St Helens and that whatever terri- 
tories be left to them, the limits should be a line running 
southeast and northwest taking from them as many of the 
towns of the Uchee Indians and as much of the coast of the 
Gulf of Mexico as is possible, which would result in rob- 
bing them of all hope of success for their projects and in 
giving us ports on that coast in which, in case of accident 
or misfortune, our war ships might take shelter. 

His Majesty therefore directs me to say to you that he 
will keep in mind all the facts presented for the betterment 
of the royal service, and that he is much pleased with the 
zeal with which you have acquired these facts and com- 
municated them. 

May God keep Your Lordship many years. 

Madrid, May 24, 1740. 
To Don Manuel de Montiano. 



To Don Manuel De Montiano. 

Issued in duplicate and triplicate, advising him of the 
receipt of his report conveying information relating to the 
English colonies and the districts which the English of 
Georgia should evacuate. 



The King has entrusted to Don Juan Francisco de Gue- 
mes y Horcasitas an expedition of importance the nature 
of which he will communicate to Your Lordship as directed. 
Toward the execution and success of this affair, it is 
proper that Your Lordship, after leaving in a state of de- 
fense that [St. Augustine] fortress, should strive with all 
available forces, and communicate all the information and 
advice expected, in order that action may be concordant 
and efficacious. His Majesty commands me to communi- 
cate to Your Lordship this decision for your information, 
and in order that the aforementioned Governor of Ha- 
bana may advise you with the punctuality demanded by 
the royal service. May God keep Your Lordship many 

Madrid, 31 October, 1741. 
To Don Manuel de Montiano. 

[No signature] * 

The King having resolved upon an expedition from that 
Island [Cuba] against the enemy, and having decided that 
its Governor General, Lieutenant Don Juan Francisco de 
Guemes y Horcasitas should organize it according to the 
orders sent him, and deeming it proper that whatever be- 
tide, the troops to be selected for the said expedition shall 
have their place taken by detachments from the squadron 
under the orders of Your Excellency, in such numbers as 
shall not interfere with its navigation, or other functions, 
His Majesty commands me to say to Your Excellency that 
you are to furnish these detachments and that if any naval 
officers should wish to go as volunteers on this expedi- 
tion, you are not to hinder them. You are to help the 
aforesaid Governor to the limit of your powers and of the 
necessities of the case, in order to bring about the end con- 
fided to him, by reason of the great interest taken in this 

• We know, however, from Montiano's answer, that thi3 and the following 
letters were all sent by the Minister Don Jose de Camplllo. 


matter by the royal service. God keep Your Excellency 
many years. 

Madrid, 31st October, 1741. 
To Don Rodrigo de Torres. 

[ No signature ] 

With regard to the resolution of His Majesty to set on 
foot from the Island [Cuba] operations against the enemy, 
and to the order sent to Lieutenant General Don Juan de 
Guemes y Horcasitas, Governor of Havana, to carry them 
out, His Majesty bids me charge you, that in case of your 
selection to take command, you are to accept and execute 
that duty, in full confidence, because of your zeal and re- 
cord of services, that you will ably discharge this trust in 
all that relates to the royal service. 

God keep Your Lordship many years. 

Madrid, 31st October, 1741 
To Don Antonio de Salas. 

[ No signature ] 

Your Excellency is informed in respect of the motives 
which induced His Majesty in the year 1737 to resolve up- 
on the extirpation of the English from the new colony of 
Georgia and from the territories of Florida which they have 
usurped, as well as of the orders sent out to this end, and 
of all dispositions made for their execution, until a suspen- 
sion was commanded. 

I bring these past matters to the recollection of Your 
Excellency, because we are now in a state of open war, 
and under no necessity to practice the caution which in the 
former conjuncture of affairs compelled us to give pause. 
His Majesty considers the time opportune to accomplish 
the destruction of Carolina and of its dependencies, thus 
compensating ourselves for the ancient perfidies of which 
the English have made the colony the seat, as well as for 
the present hostilities, by inflicting a damage that will ruin 
and terrify them, seeing the affection in which they hold 
that country, and the benefit they derive from its commerce. 
Accordingly His Majesty has directed the organization of 
an expedition from that Island [Cuba] to be composed of 
some regular troops and of as much militia as may be nec- 
essary, and that it pass over to the aforementioned province 


of Carolina with its appurtenant territories, and devastate 
it by sacking and Burning all the towns, posts, plantations 
and settlements of the enemy, for the purpose of this inva- 
sion must be solely to press hostilities until the effort shall 
have gone home, and success be achieved. It will help 
you to know that the English Colonies in America are so 
weakened by the men and supplies drawn off to lay siege 
before Cartagena that their relief from England has been 
under discussion. 

It is the intention of His Majesty that in carrying out 
this expedition, regular troops be used in such numbers as 
are indispensable, having due regard to the defense of that 
Island [Cuba] ; and that deficiencies be made up with mili- 
tia and natives in such strength as to secure favorable re- 
sults, imitating the course we followed when we recovered 
Pensacola from the power of the French. 

In order that the number of regular troops to be selected 
by Your Excellency for this purpose may not be seriously 
reduced, you may avail yourself in any emergency that may 
arise, of those in the squadron under the command of Lieu- 
tenant General Don Rodrigo de Torres, provided that he 
be not reduced to the inability of taking the seas, or of per- 
forming any other operations expected of him. To this 
end, I am inclosing an order which Your Excellency will 
hand him, directing him to further this enterprise to the 
utmost, in order to bring it to a happy issue. Although 
Your Excellency has a personal knowledge of that coun- 
try, of its nature and conditions, through previous recon- 
naissances and surveys made in view of practical possi- 
bilities, yet His Majesty desires that you communicate 
and entrust to Don Manuel de Montiano, Governor of 
Florida, the decision taken, propounding to him the meas- 
ures to be adopted to carry it out, and directing him to con- 
cur with all the forces which the state of defense of his 
post will allow. Your Excellency is to advise whether 
the enterprise is to be carried on at one point, or at sev- 
eral points (which here is thought to be the proper course), 
and to inform him in respect of said points. It is further 
His Majesty's wish that he give you all the information 
in his possession, and should go on informing himself as 
to the state of the English inhabitants of Carolina, and any 
other matters, knowledge of which might be of import to 
Your Excellency. I am inclosing a letter for that Gover- 
nor, in which you will find his instructions. 


Other directions and details are omitted, because it is 
known that Your Excellency has all the knowledge and 
light that could be desired to bring so grave a matter to a 
successful end. Hence, and because His Majesty is con- 
vinced of your zeal, activity and experience, he intrusts 
this expedition to your care, directing you to order what- 
ever may forv/ard it, with the determination that springs 
from your sense of duty and loyalty to the royal service, 
and without the loss of a moment of time. In respect of 
expenses, dispositions, and methods, Your Excellency has 
plenar}' powers to confer and treat of v/ays and means with 
officers and persons who may profit by your advice to 
spread the desolation and secure the advantages that wc 
expect in respect of that province. And in order that 
the great volume of preparations may not pass to the knowl- 
edge of the English, His Majesty orders that you take your 
measures in secret, alleging pretexts to dissimulate and 
conceal the end in view, so as to deceive the public. For 
otherwise we expose and risk this blow, which is to sur- 
prise the enemy without giving him any opportunity to 
prepare himself by arming and fortifying and so oppose a 
greater resistance and opposition to our efforts. 

His Majesty leaves to the judgment of Your Excellency 
the selection of the officer or officers to command this ex- 
pedition : you are authorized to take those most satisfac- 
tory to you, and of best known and approved conduct : but 
in the belief that Brigadier Don Antonio de Salas, who is 
detained out there [in Cuba] is well fitted for this service,^ 
I send Your Excellency the inclosed letter in order that 
you may give it to him, if you should see fit to employ him 
for the command (in which case you will be required to 
furnish him the pay corresponding to his duty, or with such 
as you may judge proper). If you do not appoint him, you 
will withhold this letter. 

If a few naval officers should wish to go as volunteers, 
you will approve it, assuring them that His Majesty will 
not lose sight of their resolution and spirit, but will assist 
them in whatever may be for their comfort, and Your Ex- 
cellency will divulge this in ample time, so that the sug- 
gestion may appear attractive. 

It is by His Majesty's command that I communicate 
these matters to Your Excellency, so that as soon as you 
shall have received this letter, you may apply yourself to 
their accomplishment, and take all other steps that may 


lead to the success of an enterprise which His Majesty de- 
sires shall be promptly carried out and which it is confi- 
dentl_Y expected will produce the results expected, as is 
plain from the fervor and zeal which you have ever shown 
in His Majesty's service. I should say to Your Excellency 
that after the enemy's country shall have been laid waste, 
the troops and militia must withdraw to that Island [Cuba], 
and a report be made of events. 

God keep Your Excellency many years. 

Madrid, Oct. 31, 1741. 

To Don Juan France de Guemes y Horcasitas. 



St. Augustine, in Florida 

12 March, 1742. 
The Governor, Don Manuel de Montiano, agreeably to 
the advice, that he must assist with all the forces possi- 
ble in bringing to a happy issue an expedition against Car- 
olina entrusted to the Governor of Habana,* reports that 
he has sent to the said Governor a return of the garrison 
of that post [Saint Augustine] for the selection of the 
troops not necessary to its defense, to serve in said expe- 
dition, and anticipating a happy issue. 


In a letter of the 31st of October of the past year, you 
did me the honor to say that the King had entrusted to 
Don Juan Francisco Guemes y Horcasitas, an expedition 
of importance which he would communicate to me as di- 
rected, and that toward the execution and success of this 
affair, I should, after leaving this post [Saint Augustine] 
in a state of defense, strive with all available forces, com- 
municating all the information and advice expected, in or- 
der that action might be concordant and efficacious. And 
that His Majesty had commanded Your Lordship to con- 
vey this decision for my information to the end that the 
aforementioned Governor might treat with me with the 
punctuality called for by the royal service. 

With regard to this determination, I have to inform Your 
Lordship, that as soon as I was informed of it, I set to 
work to acquire as much information as was possible ; and, 
without losing a moment of time, nor engaging in any other 
matter, I passed my reports on to the Lieutenant Gen- 
eral, Governor of Havana, offering my recommendations 
charged rather with hopes than with certainties. But it 
is impossible for me to say how contented I am with the 

• Navarra, in the MS. (Itself a copy of the original In the Archives at 


great administration of that Governor General, who will 
so adjust his measures to action, as morally to persuade 
me that the favorable results expected are in my opinion 
almost inevitable. 

In respect of other matters, I venture to suggest to Your 
Lordship, that, according to my comprehension of the 
case, the design of the King will be the antidote, the whole- 
some medicine, that will restore to health this debilitated 
and deserted Province, of good consideration ; for Caro- 
lina once ruined and destroyed, the extermination of her 
colonial dependencies will follow, and all the slaves now 
under her heavy yoke will pass over to us. This is what 
they most desire : as they are numerous, we shall be able 
to make here many settlements, and turn their people to 
account in war. And what is more, it will follow that the 
Indians, no longer having any one to instigate or protect 
them, will continue always with us in a state of tranquil 
peace ; these Provinces will grow and people themselves, 
since they are all as it were paramos,* and families from 
Galicia and the Canaries will be able to establish them- 
selves in quiet. 

I am sending to the aforesaid Lieutenant General, Gov- 
ernor of Havana, a return of the troops of this post, and I 
leave to his judgment the selection he may, with due re- 
gard to the defense of this place, see fit to make for the con- 
templated expedition. This is all I have to lay of this mat- 
ter before Your Lordship for the information of His Ma- 

That God keep Your Lordship many years, is my desire. 
Saint Augustine in Florida, 12 March 1742. 

Sir: I kiss your hand, being your most grateful ser- 

Don Manuel de Montiano 

[A flourish follows.] 

To Sefior Don ]os6 de Campillo.** 

*A paramo Is a high, bleak plateau; the word is South American. Pre- 
cisely what plains Montiano had in mind, of course, we do not know. In all 
probability he uses the word in a loose way. 

♦* One of the ministers of Philip V., remembered as t\ie author of a book, 
"Nnevo sistema de gobiemo econotnico para la America," published posthum- 
ously in 17S9. In this work, Campillo criticised the system of colonial ad- 
ministration and proposed certain reforms, arraying himself against the mili- 
tary system of conquest followed In America. He argued that this system, 
however necessary at first, was now out of date, and pleaded for economical 



Sir, — 

Among- the obstacles and difficulties arising in carrying 
out the will of His Majesty, and communicated by me to 
Your Lordship under date of February 3rd, past, the most 
serious was the possibility that, and doubt whether, the 
English, strengthened by the fresh re-enforcement of 4,000 
men which arrived in Jam.aica toward the end of January 
of the present year, would enter the Gulf of Mexico, and 
attempt to attack this Havana or some other position of 
the Islands. But this fear has vanished,* as you may 
see from the enclosed paper sent me by the Governor of 
[Santiago de] Cuba, and from the letter of Don Sebastian de 
Eslava,** Viceroy of Santa F^,t a copy of which I enclose. 
The occasion seemed to me therefore opportune to profit 
by this fortunate conjuncture of affairs, without however 
being able to furnish the 3,000 men nor the means which 
your Lordship warned me would be necessary to strike the 
blow directed by His Majesty. For I have neither the 
former, nor the frigates suitable to make it attainable in 
the way that I should prefer, nor any ships of war § to take 
the place of these frigates, inasmuch as these ships must 
fulfill their principal purpose. ^ 

* The allusion is to the failure of the English troops, some 5,000 in all, 
to capture Santiago. A squadron under Admiral Vernon and General Went- 
worth had landed in Guantanamo Bay; after four months' effort, the enter- 
prise was abandoned, with a loss by the English of over 2,000 men from the 
effects of the climate. 

** This officer conducted the defense of Cartagena against Admiral Ver- 
non, who failed in his attempt to capture the place. 

t New Granada, In South America, sometimes, as here, called Santa Fe, 
the Colombia of to-day. It was one of the Spanish vice-royalties, and occa- 
sionally called the reino (Kingdom) of Santa Fe. 

§In the Spanish navy of the XVIII century "the principal type of war- 
vessel was the navio [line-of-battle-ship] assisted by the fragata 

[frigate] as scout or despatch vessel." 

"Brigantines were also used on despatch duty, and packet boats ^paqve- 
botes'i." "Galleys were falling into disuse." "The armament of ships of 
war consisted of bronze and wrought-iron guns of calibre varying from 36 
to 4 (weight in pounds of the projectile). The average range was about 3,000 

Altamira y Crevea, Historia de Espana, IV, 189-190. 

J A British fleet was still in "West India waters. 


Wherefore I judged that 1,000 regulars and 800 militia 
would suffice, and under this hypothesis was elaborating 
this plan, when there arrived here an Englishman, the Cap- 
tain of the frigate captured by Fandiiio, and a man of 
'^lear mind and straightforward disposition. I tested and 
compared his representations with those of Simonin, who, 
as Your Lordship knows, is thoioughly acquainted with 
that port and its bar [Frederica], and with the number of 
whites living in Carolina, and found that his information 
differed materially from that which Your Lordship had 
sent me. 

As a result of this investigation and of my inability to 
make a greater effort than the one decided upon, I con- 
voked a secret council of war of whose decision j^ou will be 
informed by the copy that I am remitting. It is impossi- 
ble to assemble a greater number of men; and even if it 
were, we could not transport them, for what has already 
beer done under this head is due to the assistance of Lieu- 
tenant General Don Rodrigo de Torres. 

I am sending Your Lordship a boat with this news under 
the seal of inviolable secrecy, so that 3^ou may be inform- 
ed of the determination we have taken, and show the great- 
est activity in equipping the expedition, to the end that it 
shall with the greatest promptitude set sail to anchor on 
that bar [Saint Simon's], and proceed without the slightest 
delay to the extinction of that country [Georgia]. To carry 
out these orders Your Lordship will take from your 
own post 400 regular troops, 300 of your garrison, the 100 
who were sent from this place under the command of Don 
Gregorio de Aldana, and also the 100 of the militia of Pardo, 
who were sent to you at the same time. From this place 
will proceed in 30 transports composed of frigates and 
bilanders, 1,300 men, 600 regulars, 700 militia, composing 
the 1,800 without counting the seamen ; among the trans- 
ports goes separately the vessel for the 500 men who are 
immediately to embark at Saint Augustine and besides, two 
large barges w.ell armed with swivel guns Of these ves- 
sels as many as possible will proceed with guns mounted, 
to say nothing of a French frigate of 24 guns, which hap- 
pened to be in this port, and which we took for this expe- 
dition, of the packet boat "Diligent," and of the galley. I 
regard this force as sufficient to attain the end sought with 
happiness and without risk. 


All the stores and water required, go in the said ves- 
sels; it will not be necessary to draw even a single ration 
from your post. The proper ammunition, arms and im- 
plements likewise will be sent. Your Lordship will ver- 
ify the return of property of the Agent of the Exchequer, 
who is to go in charge of issues and administration. Such 
being the dispositions taken here, Your Lordship will 
have equipped the six galliots, the launches; and the 
pirogues of your garrison, as well as any other vessel that 
may prove useful ; the troops must be ready to embark at 
once, without the slightest hindrance. For delay would 
be prejudicial, since the urgency of the whole affair (whose 
success I believe to be easy) consists in this that the 
enemy shall neither perceive, nor be warned of, our inten- 

For all reasons, it has seemed to me that your appoint- 
ment to the command of this expedition will insure its 
success, for with the knowledge of Your Lordship, your 
devotion to the throne, your deeds and your experience, 
go the satisfaction and glory of His Majesty, and the sat- 
isfaction of all of us who are interested in his service, re- 
joicing over the void caused by the forces of Admiral Ver- 
non, because of the task upon which these are engaged. 

Colonel Don Francisco Rubiani, Lieutenant Colonel and 
Commandant of the Regiment of Dragoons of Italica will 
go hence in command of all that set out. From your own 
post you will arrange for the services of Don Antonio Sal- 
gado as Lieutenant Colonel. Lieutenant Colonel Don INIig- 
uel de Rivas may be left behind to command the place. 

The Engineer of the Second Grade, Don Antonio de 
Arredondo, also accompanies the expedition, as being one 
who knows those parts as far as Port Royal, and has ex- 
act and detailed information in respect of everything else. 
He may be employed by Your Lordship on any duty you 
may be pleased to order for the best interest of the under- 
taking, and can take charge of the details of operations. 
The Engineer Don Pedro Ruiz Olano may also go. Should 
Don Pedro de Estrada, a man who has given such good 
proofs of spirit and gallantr}'', be in Saint Augustine, it 
would be eminently agreeable that he should fit out his 
bilander and accompany the expedition in any capacity your 
Lordship may think proper. 

I remain convinced not only of the partial but of the en- 
tire success of our enterprise, because of Your Lordship's 


known leadership. And I am expecting at tke very least 
that the forces furnished will without the slightest let or 
hindrance forthwith destroy all the plantations as far as 
Port Royal. For as Your Lordship knows, it is His Majes- 
ty's desire that the sudden blow struck should, as far as 
its force will reach, and events permit, lay waste Carolina 
and its dependencies. But this course must be consistent 
with the information your Lordship may obtain from pris- 
oners, and with other measures to be suggested by your 
ripe judgment looking to the secure withdrawal of our 
forces through the interior channels between the Keys. It 
is of the greatest consequence and importance to raze and 
destroy Carolina and its plantations. This result can be 
better secured bv first getting rid of the regiment of Ogle- 
thorpe, which might proceed to the defense of some other 
point where hostilities had broken out, if not first attacked 
where they are now in Gualquini and Saint Simon, as pro- 
jected. It is entirely probable and credible that surprised 
by this blow, they will abandon everything and flee to the 
woods, and thus give us greater freedom to draw full profit 
from this idea and its opportunity so favorable to us. And if 
it were possible to find means to notify the negroes in good 
time to follow the cause which Your Lordship says they de- 
sire, this would be an opportune disposition for the com- 
plete success of our plans. 

The expedition over with the happy issue desired, Your 
Lordship will take steps for the immediate return, with 
the least possible expenditure of time, of the troops and 
militia about to set forth and also of the detachment which 
I sent on some time ago under the command of Don 
Gregorio Aldana, sending them in detachments in the ves- 
sels which Your Lordship will judge best fitted for the navi- 
gation of the Canal. I beg leave to remind Your Lordship 
that I have only 400 men left for the service of this place. 

Whatever I may have forgotten or omitted, I beg Your 
Lordship's attention and perspicuity to supply, as of one on 
the spot. It is my desire to overlook not even the most 
trifling circumstance which might forward the happy 
issue I am anticipating. May Your Lordship have no other 
care than to secure and bring victory, unless it be to 
employ me in any relation in which I may satisfy Your 

God keep Your Lordship many vears. 

Havana, May 14, 1742. 


Postscript in margin. 

1 warn Your Lordship that this expedition will sail hence 
the 2nd or 4th of the next month, according to the effort 
made to complete its equipment, so as to take advantage 
of the fine weather, and that you must have made all your 
preparations, and warned some of the monks of the mis- 
sions in those parts to go along as missionaries. 
Your most affectionate, faithful servant 
Who kisses your hand. 
Don Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas. 
To Don Manuel de Montiano 



Sir, — Having received orders from His Majesty, to send 
an expedition from this island against the English, his 
enemy, to punish them for the insults committed against his 
subjects, by the subjects of Great Britain in Carolina and 
by those recently and unlawfully settled in His Majesty's 
territories in a place called Georgia, and impressed by its 
importance to His Majesty's service and by the pernicious 
results of having tolerated the aforesaid insults, I have 
made up a command of all the land and naval forces I can 
possibly assemble, to accomplish these very just and very 
important ends, according to the wish of the king. 

In consequence of this and of the faculty he has bestow- 
ed upon me, to select as the commanding officer of this 
expedition, one who possesses the requisite character and 
qualities, I am led to designate you as the Commanding 
General of all these forces, as much by the confidence I 
have in your fitness and experience as because of the 
knowledge which you possess of those places. I am also guid- 
ed by your afifection for His Majesty and your zeal for his 
service, as shown in your letter of the 3rd of March of the 
present year. 

For the troops which are to be under your orders, I an- 
ticipate the greatest success, and I am directing you accord- 
ing to what I believed was best adapted to secure a 
happy termination, in conformity with the resolution of 
the board, a copy of which I have sent you, enjoining upon 
Your Lordship the least possible efifusion of the blood of 
His Majesty's troops and subjects, and to insure in any 
event a withdrawal. The number of regular troops will 
be 1,000, with proper number of officers, and of militia 800, 
composed of whites, mulattoes and negroes, also properly 
officered. These troops you will assign as will seem best 
to you. 


The naval forces which it has been possible to assemble 
are reduced to one frigate of 24 guns, to a packet boat of 
14, one galley, and the six galliots which you have with 
you ; two schooners, two bilanders, and two barges and pi- 
rogues under oars, which will be used to convoy the trans- 
ports, guard and cover the coasts and inlets, and to man- 
age and carry on within the interior channels the move- 
ment and landing of troops during the operations. All 
these elements (excepting the troops to embark at Saint 
Augustine, and the schooner and pirogues to join there) 
will leave this port [Havana] under the command of Colo- 
nel Don Francisco Rubiani, Lieutenant Colonel, Gover- 
nor, and Commanding Officer of the Regiment of Dragoons 
of Italica, who is to arrive off your bar, and deliver this 
letter to Your Lordship. He will be under your orders as 
second in command and join his forces with the troops and 
vessels, which are to be ready in the post for the campaign,. 

As the fundamental condition of the most rapid and easy 
outcome of the expedition, and of the reduction of risks,, 
consists in making withdrawal sure, in whatever misfor- 
tune, I regard as indispensable the invasion before any- 
thing else is attempted, of the Island of Saint Simon, first 
occupying the northern entrance so as to close the pass to- 
the enemy, and intercept any relief he might receive from 
that direction ; the landing is to take place from three ves- 
sels at one and the same time on the beach facing east. 

This first step having been, thanks to the Divine Grace, 
and to Your Lordship's wise management, successfully 
taken, Your Lordship will next adopt such measures as 
are suggested by the information you may have or obtain,, 
to proceed northward by interior channels, devastating, 
laying waste, sacking and burning whatever settlements, 
plantations, and towns there may be as far as Port Royal 
inclusive, razing its fort, and taking possession of the en- 
tire country; for Your Lordship is informed of the fact 
that those parts hold no hostile troops able to resist those 
under your command. The necessity of gaining time Avhen- 
ever possible, without any delay must ever be kept in mind, 
so as to give no opportunity for resistance to form. Our 
operations must, under His Majesty's commands, be re- 
duced to a sudden stroke, and for this reason the greatest 
celerity is imperative. 

After taking possession of Port Royal, it will be proper 
to send out negroes of all languages (some of which sort 


accompany the militia of this place for this very purpose) 
to convoke the slaves of the English in the plantations 
round about, and offer them, in the name of our King, lib- 
erty, if they will deliver themselves up of their own accord, 
and to say that lands will be assigned them in the terri- 
tories of Florida, which they may cultivate and use for 
themselves as owners, under the direction and laws of the 
Kingdom of Spain. In proportion as you receive and ob- 
tain (and this I believe will be the case) trusthworthy and 
favorable information forwarding the conquest and increas- 
ing the damage done the enemy, you will act accordingly, 
never losing sight of the importance of making sure of 
your withdrawal, in order not to lose the fruit of our opera- 

All the neutral and friendly vessels met on the way, you 
may detain, requiring them to follow the convoy, until 
there sliall be no disadvantage in allowing them to pro- 
ceed on their course. To the person who goes as agent 
in charge of all matters relating to the Royal Exchequer, 
in respect of the good and economical administration of 
warlike stores and implements, you will afford all neces- 
sary help, showing him and requiring him to show the 
greatest attention, corresponding to the confidence I have 
reposed in him, and maintaining the best of relations with 
him, in order that the service may thus be punctually and 
easily performed. 

All the effects found and taken by our troops you will 
collect and keep in a secure place under the supervision 
of the agent of the Royal Exchequer, who will be required 
to make an inventory for the distribution in equal parts 
among soldiers, militia and sailors. 

As regards prisoners, in respect of whose classes and 
numbers no decision can be reached in advance. Your 
Lordship will take such measures as seem most suitable ; 
just as in all the other cases that come up, you will make 
such decisions as most redound to the advantage of the 
King's service, and to the glory and reputation of his arms. 

The expedition having been concluded with the happy 
issue that we have a right to expect. Your Lordship will 
direct that the troops and militia of this place [Havana] re- 
turn to it without the slightest delay, in the vessels that 
can make the best way through the channel,* seeing that 

• The Florida Channel. 


now the southwest winds will prevail ; all the ships will 
take the same course, even at the cost of increased labor 
and of a longer voyage, because thus we avoid encounters 
which otherwise might have injurious consequences for 

The Second Engineer, Don Antonio de Arredondo, goes 
informed with regard to all I have been able to anticipate 
and advance for the success and safety of this important 
operation. He will communicate with you, so that you 
may select what may appear to you best fitted for the happy 
issue of our plans, the glory and satisfaction of our royal 
master, and of his royal intentions. I am inclosing to 
your Lordship a full cop}'- of the orders under which I have 
been acting, and of which I beg that you will acquire full 

Commending myself to your Lordship in the sincerest 
affection, I pray Our Lord to keep you many years. 

Havana, June 2, 1742. Your most affectionate faithful 
servant, who kisses your hand. 

Don Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas. 
To Don Manuel de Montiano. 


Illustrations of Spanish Guns. 

40 cm, Cal., 21 cm. long. 
1709 A. D. 6031 Artillery Museum. 

5477 Cannon. 

310 cm. long, 15.2 cm. Calibre 

XVIII Century. 
Artillery Museum, Madrid. 


Length ) 

BOMBARD — mounted and assembled. 

Cana 255 cm. 

Recamara 81 " ] Made 1518 A. D. 
No. 3301 in Artillery Museum, Madrid. 
This piece has 2 recamaras — ^used alternately. 

3356 Artillery Museum, 


144 cm. long, 16.5 cm. Calibre. 

Made 1679. 


5489. Museum of Artillery, Madrid. 
1773 A. D. 

Can /^ 


BOMBARD Complete No. 6587 Artillery Museum 

240 cm. long XV Century. Madrid. 

3570 Artillery Museum, Madrid. 

105 cm. long, 6.7 cm. Calibre. 



Orders to be obeyed by the commander of the Fleet, and 
instructions for his guidance, with the understanding that he 
is in all matters to be under the orders of the general 
selected to command the expedition which is to dislodge the 
foreigners that have settled and established themselves in 
the dominions of the King in the Provinces of Florida. 

1. He w^ll leave the post of Havana, if the v/cather per- 
mit, on the day appointed, with all the vessels of war and 
transports after having made all necessary arrangements 
to keep his ships together in good order during the journey, 
and established signals for prompt comprehension and cor- 
rect action in any case that may come up. He will like- 
wise have drawn up the special orders to be observed with 
all the precision and claritv possible by the respective com- 
manders of the vessels under his command 

2. He will proceed directly to Saint Augustine in 
Florida, without anchoring anywhere, unless driven to it 
by inevitable necessit3^ 

3. When in sight of the Bar of Saint Augustine he will 
approach as closely as possible, and anchor with his entire 
fleet on the bar. 

4. As soon as the tide serves, he will order the trans- 
ports to enter the harbor, and anchor in front of the castle. 

5. As soon as the said tide nears the flood, he will de- 
termine whether the depth on the bar will permit the en- 
trance of the vessels under his command, without lighten- 
ing, and if so, these will enter, and proceed to anchor in 
front of the Hermitage of Our Lady de la Leche. Should 
lightening prove necessary, all will execute it at the same 
time with the greatest dispatch, transporting in launches 
and boats the weight that may be necessary. But this is 
to be done only in case it is impossible, by reason of storms, 
to remain at anchor outside. 

6. He will remain in port (or wherever else he may 
think proper) until the commanding general gives orders 


to begin operations and put to sea with his entire fleet, 
which he will obey without loss of time. 

7. He will convoy the flotilla of small vessels that are 
to cross the bar of the Saint John's River, until he sights 
its inlets on an east and west line, when he will either lie-to, 
or if the weather permit, anchor; the first is the better 
course, if it should be necessary to go outside under the 
threat of the east wind, dangerous on this coast; the sec- 
ond, in order to avoid drifting with the currents. Circum- 
stances must determine which of these two courses ap- 
pears to him the better, without losing sight of the fact 
that he must endeavor as far as possible to keep the coast 
in view during the entire course of the expedition so as 
distinctly to observe the signals made from it, or to re- 
ceive information sent out to him, since the happy issue of 
the enterprise depends partly if not entirely on the unity 
and joint effort of the two fleets. 

8. He will lie-to or remain at anclior, as may be deter- 
mined, off the inlets, until he shall have received from the 
beach a signal to proceed on his course. 

9. He will continue on his way, observing both by day 
and by night the signals made to him from land, so that on 
receiving information of the point at which the interior 
flotilla happens to be resting, he will again anchor or lie-to, 
until again ordered to proceed. For, as the interior flotilla 
can proceed only when the tide is favorable, at intervals 
of six hours and a few minutes, it is incumbent on the sea 
fleet so to adjust its progress, as to be but a short distance 
away, and so avoid slipping on and then being discovered 
by the foreigners of Fort Frederica or Gualquini before 
the interior flotilla shall have come up and taken its dis- 
position for attack. 

10. Should some accident prevent people coming down 
to the shore to make signals, he will proceed along the 
coast under shortened sail ; and, after taking into account 
the change of tides, and whatever may further the advance, 
will estimate approximately where the interior flotilla 
must be, giving due regard to the increase of distance 
caused by the windings of the interior channels, and by the 
fact that on some nights it will perhaps be impossible to 
sail and take advantage of the tide on account of a few 
narrow passes impossible to navigate save by day. 

11. He will also consider a possible delay due to the 
■capture of the Fort of Vegeses on the channel of the Island 


of Whales, this in order that both fleets may always be ap- 
proximately on the same parallel. And if all the precau- 
tions mentioned should remain without the result expected, 
after having maturely weighed the aforesaid contingencies, 
and adjusted his course accordingly, he will set his course 
directly for the entrance of Gualquini, where he will an- 
chor on the bar with his entire squadron in from four and 
a half to six fathoms, so as to bring the point of the north 
of the Island of Saint Simon to bear N. N. W., and that of 
the north of the bar of Whales to bear S. W. ^ S. If 
while on this position, the sea should rise and, unable to 
ride it out, he should fear that his cables would not hold, 
he may go in nearer to shelter himself, setting his course 
N. W. y^ W., and proceeding some four miles in four fath- 
oms of water, so that the said point of the Island of Saint 
Simon shall bear N., that of Whales S. S. W., and the Castle 
of Frederica W. N. W., this being recognizable by the red- 
dish color of the mound of earth at the shoulder of the 
bastion. If however, he can maintain himself without the 
said risk in the said six fathoms, he will do so, in order to 
be in a better position to land, on account of the surf on 
the shoals at the entrance. 

12. He will maintain himself thus at anchor, with the 
English flag flying, unless signalled to get under way and 
capture the port. This the commanding general will or- 
der to take place on the beach of the south point at the 
place marked R,* whenever the opportune occasion shall 
arise, as determined by his readiness to surprise or attack 
the fort which the foreign settlers have built on the island 
in question. This in turn will depend on the time of junc- 
tion of the two fleets, provided always that not the slight- 
est movement shall take place until the proper signal is 

13. As soon as he shall see the said signal, he will order 
the landing body assigned to this duty with its officers to 
embark in launches, and direct it to go ashore on the 
nearest beach of the Island of Saint Simon outside of the 
surf of the north shoals, near the point Q. 

14. The said landing shall be so ordered that the troops 
shall set foot ashore a short time before dawn, neither 
sooner nor later. To this end he shall measure the time he 
may consider necessary, having the day before marked the 

• The chart to which reference is made here and elsewhere In these 
orders, has apparently not come down to us. 


shoals and indicated the nearest point for the execution of 
the plan, and approximately observed the distance between 
shipside and shore. Although announcing that one and 
the same signal will be made of the arrival of the interior 
flotilla in the Bay of Gualquini, of the disembarkation of 
the troops and of their getting under way to enter the port, 
yet, even though the said signal be made at the hour of 
prayers, or later, or at any other hour, he will not on that 
account undertake any movement before the time already 
mentioned of the break of day, unless the signal should be 
made to undertake everything at the moment when it is 
set, no matter what the hour, because it is possible that this 
course might be advantageous; and in this case he will 
without the slightest delay set about the disembarkation, 
and get under way to capture the port provided that this 
operation take place by daylight. 

15. As soon as the launches carrying the troops shall 
have sheered ofif, the commander will, if the tide be falling, 
stand by with his anchors apeak; if not falling, he will 
hoist sail ; if the wind does not serve, he will begin to tow, 
or do whatever he thinks best. With the bilanders lead- 
ing ahead by the hawse he will set out to capture the port, 
using his best endeavor to have the landing troops very 
early in the morning surprise the look-out of the foreign- 
ers, marked O on the chart. He will also cause the fleet 
to take the port as early as possible, so that the enemy 
seeing himself attacked on all sides without hope of relief 
shall at once surrender without resistance. 

16. This bar of Gualquini lies in north latitude 31° 18', 
with 6 to 43/2 fathoms at the point mentioned above. To 
enter the port, set the course N. W. % W., and continue on 
it in 4^ and 5 fathoms till 3>2 are reached; shift to N. W. 
J4 N., when the bar will be found, with 3^^ fathoms at half 
tide. From this point with course N. W. 54 W., easing to 
N. W., 5, 6, and 7 fathoms will be found, deepening until 
a line north and south through the fort of the strangers is 
crossed, where 14 fathoms will be obtained, shallowing as 
shown on the chart. 

17. Having taken the position mentioned with his squad- 
ron, if the foreigners open fire on him with their artillery, 
he will return it, as will also all the boats under his com- 
mand, signal having been previously made to form in line 
and to fire on the enemy in the aforesaid case. But if they 
do not open fire upon his ships, he will in no wise fire him- 


self, but will merely order his vessels to anchor in good or- 
der in the part marked thus Y, provided that if he should be 
compelled to fire against the hostile fort, he will endeavor 
to dismount and disable its guns. He will direct that in 
going about, so as to use both broadsides, all vessels must 
have their launches and boats ahead by the hawse, to pre- 
vent drifting with the current, in order that they may with 
the greatest promptitude forge ahead or in any other direc- 
tion which may appear to him suitable. It is indispensable 
that each vessel go about in the proper place in which it 
may find itself, the vanguard and rear guard standing on 
opposite tacks. For if the said maneuver is not executed 
in this form and the ships lose their positions, it will be 
impossible to make head against the current so as to pre- 
sent the other broadside to the enemy. 

18. From the conditions already laid down, it is evi- 
dent that the ships should lie-to when delivering their fire, 
keeping up against wind and current in such manner as to 
secure, without undue drifting, a good position for the pur- 
pose in hand. 

19. It is possible that in this port of Gualquini we shall 
find at anchor a packet boat or war vessel which they own. 
If this shall not have surrendered when he arrives with his 
squadron, he will take possession of it, either by capitula- 
tion or by force, if it resists ; he must send it to the bottom 
without giving quarter to anybody; but if it surrenders vol- 
untarily, he will give it the best treatment possible. 

20. If while at anchor outside on the bar with the En- 
glish flag flying, as already arranged, there should come out, 
as is usual, a boat to reconnoiter or to bring a pilot, he will 
cause it to be captured with the boats and launches which 
he will have overboard and ready from the moment he shall 
have anchored. 

21. Should he be forced by any wind to remove from 
the coast and for this reason be unable to see all the sig- 
nals, then, as soon as the wind shall have ceased, he will 
return to the coast, and depending on the length of time 
that he will have been absent, he will examine the state in 
which he finds the interior flotilla. As a measure of pru- 
dence, and according to the conclusions arrived at, he will 
see to it that no matter what cause, contingency, delay, or 
weather shall have come up, the flotilla shall cross over to 
the Bay of Gualquini and take whatever action has been 
decided upon. 


22. Whenever he encounters vessels, he will cause them 
to be searched as he may think proper; but no matter of 
what nation they may be, he will, for the purpose of em- 
barrassing the enemy, take possession of them, either peace- 
fully or by force, and of all the commercial vessels belong- 
ing to these new colonies, from which are to be evicted the 
intruding settlers as having furtively and illegally settled 
upon them. But if these vessels should be registered from 
Noyorca* and bound to St. Augustine with stores for its 
garrison, or else returning from the said place to their own 
country or coming from any other country, in respect of 
which the reason given above does not hold good, he will 
not capture them, but will compel and order them to con- 
tinue their voyage under his convoy. He will take these 
precautions to make sure of the first class of vessels, and to 
detain the second, until the commanding general may have 
taken cognizance of the case and ordered that there is no 
objection to giving them their liberty. 

23. The bilanders and other smaller vessels under his 
command will proceed nearer to the coast than the larger 
ships, in order that they may the more clearly and prompt- 
ly pick up the signals made from it and communicate them 
to the flagship, according to the directions which the com- 
mander of the fleet shall have given to this end before leav- 
ing port. 

24. As soon as this operation shall have been concluded, 
he will leave the port of Gualquini with his squadron and 
landing body and proceed directly to the Bay of Saint 
Simon, at whose entrance he will anchor on the bar in 
proper order and with the same precautions which he ob- 
served in that of Gualquini. Here he will remain until the 
commanding general orders him by pre-arranged signal 
to put to sea, so that if the signal should be set to disem- 
bark his people, he will answer by executing the order and 
sending his launches to the beach on the south point of the 
entrance. In this case, he will order the captains of the 
bilanders to sail into the harbor and join hands with the in- 
terior flotilla, with orders to fire on the redoubt of the for- 
eigners, if this should open. If on the contrary, it should 
not, he will keep his station with his ships without under- 
taking any movement whatever as much to avoid risking 
his ships in entering and leaving the harbor as because it 

•New Tork, probably. 


has been considered unnecessary to employ so great a force 
in the reduction of the redoubt and its garrison, and princi- 
pally to prevent hostile vessels from going south and thus 
possibly embarrassing the w^ithdrawal of our own vessels 
through the interior channels. To this end, he will con- 
stantly maintain in the tops a good guard of men of the 
utmost trustworthiness, who will attentively keep a good 
lookout in all directions. 

25. As soon as he shall have seen the bilanders leaving 
the said port and a signal to make sail and continue the 
voyage, he w'ill obey it, setting his course with his entire 
squadron direct for the bar of Las Cruces [Tybee Bar] ; and 
without waiting for any other order or signal, he will enter 
the bay. 

26. The mouth of Las Cruces, he will recognize by 
means of a lofty, wooden tower, which the foreigners have 
built on the north point; on the south, they have a small 

27. On coming within sight of the said bar, he will hoist 
the English ensign and will keep it flying until he shall 
have entered and placed himself in a position to prevent 
communication of this event to other parts. He will then 
hoist the Spanish ensign and at the same time will send an 
officer ashore under a white flag with orders to inform the 
commanding officer of the fort, that if he does not surren- 
der without resistance or delay, he will be put to the sword 
with his entire garrison without exception, and to tell him 
at the same time that the remaining forts and settlements of 
the south have been depopulated and ruined and that 
a strong fleet is coming by the interior channels to destro)' 
and reduce to naught those which may have remained. 

28. The officer designated for this duty will carefully 
observe the disposition and force of the redoubt and the 
strength of its garrison in order that in case of refusing to 
surrender and ofifering resistance, the most convenient and 
best measures may be taken to capture it. He will with- 
draw to his ship, as soon as he has executed his commis- 

29. While all this is going on, he [the Naval Comman- 
der] will anchor in the middle of the channel, posting the 
vessels under his order, so as to occupy both mouths of 


the Tamaja,* these being the same which on joining form 
the Savannah River. In this way, all the approaches will 
be covered and the communications of the enemy embar- 

30. If the commanding officer of the said fort should 
surrender without resistance, the garrison will be distrib- 
uted among the vessels of the fleet, orders being given to 
treat them well. The guns, munitions and stores found 
will be collected and orders given to burn to the ground all 
the houses and to ruin and destroy whatever may be found. 
The same orders will be issued with regard to the tower 

31. If the commanding officer, in contempt of the cour- 
teous and peaceful proposition made to him, should decide 
to defend himself, the naval commander will make the best 
disposition to invest the place. He will disembark troops 
in sufficient number, having regard to the report on the 
garrison of the fort and its situation made by the officer 
he sent ashore, to secure success without risk, because if 
he considers that the operation is somewhat difficult he 
must not expose himself, but instead will send with the 
greatest dispatch one or two launches, well armed and 
manned, to the south through the channels, with an offi- 
cer to report everything accurately to the general ; and, 
in addition, the conclusion he had come to in respect of what 
is needed to attack and conquer the said fort and settle- 
ment. The officer will be enjoined to travel night and day 
until he shall have met the interior flotilla. He must be 
furnished with the countersign and parole because it is 
considered important that this information should reach 
the general as soon as possible. 

32. Even should the commanding general of the fort 
surrender without resistance, the two launches will be 
sent to report this result to the commanding general with 
all the incidents which mav have occurred, and with an ac- 
count of the state in which it was found. 

33. Since it is possible in the said port to find a few ves- 
sels from Europe, bringing stores and people, for the sup- 
port of these settlements, he will take as many as he shall 

* This word suggests the Altamaha: but as this stream has no connection 
with the Savannah, it is not impossible that the scribe has written T for Y, 
and that the word is really Yamaja, i. e., Yamacraw. If this emendation be 
acceptable, then the author of these orders probably has some local con- 
figuration in mind. 


have found, using them for the service and re-enforcement 
of his squadron. He will take the most exact precautions 
for safety until the general shall have joined and given 
directions, the expedition being concluded, for its orderly 
and well-arranged withdrawal. 

There is no doubt that in all relations the general v/ill 
labor, in accordance vv^ith the zeal and experience he is 
knov/n to have, for the complete success of the royal ser- 
vice, and the glory and reputation of the king's arms. In 
respect of accidents which cannot be anticipated, I have 
confidence that his experience and prudence will lead him to 
display the same zeal in prosperity as in adversity, and a 
perfect constancy, such that neither will success produce the 
slightest carelessness nor misfortune abate his courage, 
keeping in mind, as he will, that all of us depend upon the 
Divine Omnipotence to which must be attributed both 
prosperity and adversity, while displaying on his own part 
the diligence, activity and strength that are required to 
achieve success in anything upon which we have set oifr 



Sir, — 

Hoping as I have been from day to day to receive from 
Florida the happy news I had promised myself of the suc- 
cessful results achieved by the expedition against the En- 
glish Colonies in the North, I had kept back the dispatch 
boat under the command of Don Juan Baptista Goicochea, 
which had entered this port from Vera Cruz on its way 
back to Spain, so as more promptly to communicate this 

Accordingly, on the eighth instant, through the fortu- 
nate arrival, after 42 days' journey, of a boat which was 
sent to me, I learned that the first convoy of small vessels 
had on the 9th of June safely reached the Bar of Saint 
Augustine, as did on the 15th of the same month, that of 
the larger ones, which left this port under the orders of 
the Naval Lieutenant, Don Antonio Castaneda. At Ra- 
tones Inlet, the messenger was pursued by an English 
sloop, which was trying to capture him, and so he was 
compelled to run aground, but succeeded in saving all his 
people and the dispatches which later he managed to send 
on to me in a coast fishing boat. 

Just when I thought that the expedition was at least well 
advanced, if not as completely successful as we had reason 
to expect, the Governor of Florida tells me in letters that 
I received, dated the 26th, and postdated the 28th and 29th 
of the same month of June, that partly on account of the 
bad weather and partly on account of the necessity of water- 
ing the boats, and of other inconveniences arising out of 
the difficulties and dangers of navigation over that bar 
[the Bar of St. Augustine], he had been as yet unable to 
embark the troops which were to set out from that garrison 
to join hands with those from this particular place and with 
the militia which has been selected for the purpose. Upon 
this aforementioned day, the 29th, he was still at 


St. Augustine with all the troops on board ready to put to 
sea to carry out the orders with which he was charged. The 
Engineer of the Second Class,* Don Antonio de Arredondo 
reports the same thing to me, sending me the journal which 
accompanies this letter and includes the 23d of the said 
June. From this journal, Your Excellency will take note 
of the encounter between some of the small vessels of the 
first convoy, on the coast of Florida between the Bar of 
Mosquitos and that of Matanzas. It would seem that the 
English had gone in a boat and launch to capture a small 
sloop from the presidio of Florida, which was carrying the 
detachment of artillerymen from the garrison of this place 
[Havana] as well as to capture another launch from this 
port. As they boarded these vessels to loot them, our peo- 
ple who had jumped ashore, fired upon them from the sand 
dunes, and compelled them to surrender to the number of 
sixteen, among them a lieutenant of the frigate. In this 
affair, we had the misfortune to lose the sub-lieutenant of 
artillery and the corporal of the detachment. 

Notwithstanding Arredondo's assertion, under date of 
19th, in his journal, that from a few prisoners returned by 
Don Diego Oglesor, Governor of Georgia, to the coasts of 
Florida, it was learned they had discovered nothing of our 
plans, yet I feared that they had been warned by the delay, 
so far of 14 days, off the bar of Saint Augustine, of a fleet 
so numerous as ours and that it was not impossible that 
they might be on their guard, and so hinder us ; and all this 
in spite of the effort I had made in advance, to advise the 
Governor of Florida through an officer (as I informed Your 
Excellency in a letter of June 8, of which I inclose a dupli- 
cate), who arrived more than 20 days before the arrival 
of the convov of larger vessels under the command of Don 
Antonio de CastaSeda. 

Having received this news, and fearing that through the 
delay they had already made they might suffer, if supplies 
should be lacking, and in order to forestall any accident due 
to necessity or want, I at once prepared a brigantine and a 
sloop to send a month's supplies in addition to those of three 
months and a half that they took out with them. These 
boats left this port with the stores on the 15th inst. On 

• Ingeniero en segundo, Tt was not until 1756 that engineers held mili- 
tary rank in the Spanish army, elsewhere In these papers, Arredondo U 
given the first grade, ingenerlo en jefe. 


the following day there returned to it a sloop, one of those 
that had set out with the expedition, and in it came Naval 
Lieutenant the Marquess de Casinas and the captain of the 
militia battalion of this place, Don Laureano Chacon, with 
his company. From these officers I learned that the issue of 
the expedition had not corresponded to our well-founded 
hopes and to the measures that had been taken for its suc- 
cess, and that all the vessels in different divisions had strug- 
gled to regain Florida and this place Havana, without any 
other result than that of having attacked Gualquini with 
success, capturing its forts, artillery, mortars, munitions and 
implements ; and that this outcome was due to the bad 
weather which had delayed and disordered the execution 
of our plans, to say nothing of hindrances later encountered 
and felt. 

I have up to the present day no other information than 
that given me by the aforesaid officers, and that which is 
contained in more or less detail in the private diary kept by 
the Marquess de Casinas of daily events, and brought off 
by him and given to me. 

Seeing now that the whole expedition had begun to re- 
treat and that they had sighted land six leagues farther to 
the south of Saint Augustine, these officers judged it proper 
to set their course for this port and assured me that the 
other boats were doing the same thing. 

Such being the news in hand, it has appeared to me proper 
no longer to delay the dispatch boat under the command of 
Don Juan Baptista Goicochea. As soon as I shall have re- 
ceived the information to be given me by the Governor of 
Florida, it will be dispatched in another boat which I am 
holding ready for the purpose. I shall then explain with 
greater particularity all that has happened and the reasons 
that prevailed against continuing the expedition and in 
favor of forming the resolution to retreat. 

As I had already made up my mind, from the condi- 
tion in which I considered the enemy to be and from the 
superiority of our forces, that at the very latest, his towns, 
plantations and settlements would be attacked and des- 
troyed as far as Port Royal; and as I had even flattered 
myself that these favorable results might be obtained as 
far as Carolina [Charleston] I have been profoundly aston- 
ished at the frustration of hopes so well founded of serving 
the king advantageously and maintaining the glory of his 
arms; and that the labor and zeal inspired by my devotion, 


and by my interest in our success should have come to 
naught. But although not successful everywhere, yet 
according to the relation of the Marquess de Casinas, the 
destruction of the forts and settlement of Gualquini and 
that of Bejeces was accomplished. That many stores and 
implements should have been destroyed, and the harbor 
gallantly forced in the face of all its fire, both by sea and 
land, with such intrepidity, as reported by those to whom 
I have talked on the subject, is due to Don Antonio 

The King and Your Excellency do not need to be inform- 
ed how deeply I am mortified that this expedition has not 
been carried out to the complete satisfaction of His Majes- 
ty's desires ; and that on my part nothing was omitted that 
could have the least bearing on its happiest issue. Until 
all the vessels with the troops and militia shall have re- 
turned, I shall take all the precautions that are due. 

Praying Your Excellency to report to His Majesty the re- 
sults so far of this operation, may God keep Your Excel- 
lency many years. 

Havana, August 18, 1742. 

Excellent Sir: 

Your most humble, grateful servant kisses your hand. 
Don Juan Francisco, 

Guemes y Horcasitas. 
(A Flourish.) 
To His Excellency Don Joseph de Campillo. 

[Letter acknowledging receipt of that of Guemes, with 

With the letter of Your Excellency of the 18th of August, 
have been received the accompanying reports and diary, 
treating of the management and progress of the expedition 
which left your port against Carolina. We have also the 
news reported to Your Excellency, through Naval Lieuten- 
ant Don Carlos Riggio (who has arrived at that place 
[Havana] ) by the Governor of Florida, and also that for- 
warded by Your Excellency in a letter of the 20th, to the 
effect that on that day Don Antonio Castaneda returned to 
that port [Havana] with the greater part of the convoy and 
troops. The King, having acquainted himself with your 
report upon the measures and arrangements you made for 


this expedition, and also with your reflections upon its is- 
sue, and the reasons why it did not come up to the expecta- 
tions produced by the forces and arrangements with which 
it was undertaken, desires me to express to Your Excel- 
lency his satisfaction with everything done by Your Excel- 
lency, a satisfaction in exact agreement with the confidence 
!he was gracious enough to repose in your zeal and efficiency. 
He considers as entirely sound the remarks you make 
upon the unhappy issue of events. His Majesty under- 
stands that this is to be traced to the poor direction, lack 
of diligence and inefficiency of the one who should have 
made extraordinary efforts to profit by the advantages that 
placed success within his grasp. 
May God keep you many years. 

San Ildefonso, October 28, 1742. 
To Don Juan Francisco Guemes y Horcasitas.* 


June 5, 1742. 

At sunrise the signal was made to put to sea and execut- 
ed by the entire convoy, as it was ready to sail. At twelve 
o'clock, we sallied from the Morro, at which time we haul- 
ed up our launches and boats; steady drizzle. 

June 6th. 

From yesterday noon until today at the same hour: at 
one o'clock in the afternoon we ran into a rain squall with- 
out wind, which lasted until 5. We stood all night under 
foresail and mizzen sail until 5 o'clock in the morning. At 
noon, we took the sun, but as there were great differences 
in the observations, we took the mean to fix the course 
which was northeast by north. 

June 7th. 

From yesterday until today: at sunset, all the elements 
of the convoy kept together. At nine in the evening, great 
signs of a squall which burst upon us with thunder, light- 
ning and rain, 'lasting until one o'clock in the night. At 
sunrise two vessels were missing. At noon, we took the 

• Not signed but probably written by Campillo. In the MS. this letter 
follows Arredondo's diary. We have put It where it belongs, immediately 
after the letter which it acknowledges. 


sun and found our latitude to 24° 40', and our longitude 
205° 16'. At this hour the two boats which had been miss- 
ing rejoined us. 

June 8th. 

From yesterday until today: at one o'clock in the after- 
noon, we sighted Long Key, its northeast head bearing 
north five and a half decrees toward the east and the south- 
west point, west. At sunset all the vessels were together. 
At midday the sun gave us 25° 3' latitude and longitude 
295° 40', all the vessels being together. 

June 9th. 

At three of the afternoon, signal was made to crowd on 
all sail which was kept up till four. At six land was dis- 
covered from the top and recognized by the pilot as Bis- 
cayne Key which bore west by north at a distance of five 
leagues. At six in the morning, the top announced that 
only twenty-two vessels were in sight : at seven, land was 
visible and after examination by the pilot he declared that 
it was the shore of Jega, bearing west by northwest. At 
8 a sloop signalled that she wished to speak to us, and ob- 
serving that her bowsprit had been injured, the Honduran 
was sent to find out what was the matter, and returned say- 
ing, that it was the royal sloop "St. Joseph," and that the 
night before, on going about, the guard schooner had foul- 
ed her, and thus had damaged her bowsprit, but that she 
was not making any water nor had suffered any other dam- 
age. At noon we took the sun and found ourselves in 26° 
54' latitude and 295° 25' longitude. On this day a sloop 
of the convoy was missing. 

June 10th. 

From yesterday until today: at 4 of the afternoon, we 
sighted main land, being the palm grove of Ays, according 
to the pilot. At 5, signal was set to go about, which was 
executed by the entire convoy, the course being set S. E., 
with the wind E. N. E. At sunset the top announced that 
only twenty-two vessels were in sight. At this hour we 
had lost the land. The whole night remained calm. At 
sunrise we saw the same vessels as those of yesterday after- 
noon and found at noon our latitude to be 28° 28' and lon- 
gitude 292° 15'. 


June 11th. 
From yesterday until today : at 1 :30 of the afternoon 
signal was made to put about, which was done, and the 
course set W. ^ N. W., the wind being north and light. At 
sunset all the boats visible this morning were still in sight. 
The whole night a moderate wind blew out of the south- 
west. At sunrise twenty-one vessels were seen. At noon, 
we took soundings and found ourselves in twenty-two 
fathoms, bottom reddish gravel and dark colored sand. 
At ten, we tacked to the S. S. W., wind west, and at noon 
our latitude was 30° 1' and longitude 295° 10'. 

June 12th. 
From yesterday until today : at 2 :30 of the afternoon 
sounded in twenty-six fathoms; found the bottom the same, 
for which reason we decided to cast anchor because the 
currents were carrying us to leeward. Signal to this effect 
was made and obeyed. At sunset only eighteen vessels 
were seen because apparently the currents had prevented 
their keeping together, and at the same time it was con- 
jectured that they were invisible because the horizon was 
overcast. The entire night was calm, with the wind to the 
southwest, but we found the currents extremely strong; 
at 5 :30 of the morning, signal was made to hoist sail, which 
was done with the wind to the northwest, course S. W. 
Only fifteen vessels were visible, being those only that had 
anchored. At noon, our observation gave us 29° 42' lati- 
tude, and longitude 245° 4'.* 

June 13th. 
From yesterday until today : at one of the afternoon, we 
set our course W. S. W., with the wind north, northwest, 
eastern horizon heavily submerged. At three of the after- 
noon we saw land but could not make out what it was, 
bearing W. ^ S. W., at a distance of three leagues. At 
sunset signal to go about and set the course east, wind 
north, northeast. At this hour only fourteen vessels were 
in sight. The eastern horizon was strongly overcast, with 
more or less indications of weather. At ten at night the wind 
freshened from the north into a squall so that we stood un- 
der foresail and mizzensail. At three in the morning signal 
was made to change our course to the E. S. E. and S. E., 
with the wind northeast, this on account of having sounded 
and found only twelve fathoms and a half. The night con- 

• So In original, probably Copyist's error for 295" 4' 


tinued calm with some swell until half past four, when the 
wind settled in the south and southeast with many squalls 
and showers. At this hour we set our course to the E, and 
E. 34 N. E. At sunrise, the sun being invisible, the top 
announced that fifteen vessels were in sight. Afterwards 
two others, small ones, were discovered and a frigate to 
the windward which made a signal of recognition which 
was answered, and we found it to be the Sacra Familia, so 
that we were now eighteen, all told. At ten we sounded 
in fifteen fathoms and the skies having cleared and the rain 
stopped, signal was made to head south, the wind being 
east-southeast. At midday we took the sun and found our 
position to be latitude 29° 28', and longitude 297° 7'. 

June 14th. 
From yesterday till today; at six of the afternoon, sig- 
nal made to set the course N, E. by N., with the wind east- 
southeast. At this hour there was a flurry of rain. At 
sunset seventeen vessels were in sight, the two small ones 
that were seen this morning having been unable to come 
up. The night continued calm, and the currents proving 
more powerful than the wind, we cast anchor in twelve 
and a half fathoms of water at half past one in the morning. 
At six, signal to make sail was set, which we all did, with 
the course S. S. W. ; wind east-southeast, which all six- 
teen vessels executed. At 8:00 land was seen at a distance 
of four leagues and a half, continuous coast. At midday 
the sun gave us 29° latitude and at the same time we recog- 
nized that we were off the bar of Mosquito Inlet, for which 
reason we set our course N. N. W. 

June 15th. 
From yesterday till today: at six of the afternoon, the 
packet boat "Diligent" was signalled to come up within 
speaking distance and ordered to press all sail and hasten 
to reconnoiter the bar of Matanzas and inform us by can- 
non shot and to hoist a signal lantern for our guidance ; and 
that as soon as she should be off the bar of Saint Augus- 
tine, she should anchor, and from time to time make a 
smoke signal. We continued with the rest of the vessels 
on the same course and at one o'clock in the morning an- 
chored east and west on a line with the tower of St. Anas- 
tasia in twelve fathoms of water. As soon as it dawned 
we discovered at anchor the seven vessels which had been 
missing. They had succeeded in getting in two days 


before, so that we were finally all reunited. At 8:00 there 
came alongside a boat from the garrison to take ashore the 
second in command, Don Francisco Rubiani and myself. 
The officer who came ofif told us that on the 5th, the first 
division of small vessels that had set out from Havana on 
the first day, having run into an English frigate, our gal- 
ley called upon her to show her colors and as she failed to 
do so, we cleared for action and opened fire on her with 
our guns, to which the frigate made no answer, and under 
her courses alone, advanced upon our galley, and prepared 
to attack her. But this design was perceived, and the wind 
being fresh, the galley rejoined the convoy under a signal 
to press on all sail ; but her commanding officer seeing that 
the Saint Augustine sloop, in which were embarked the 
sub-lieutenant and the artillerymen of Havana, was far 
astern, gave orders to stick close to the sloop and resist 
the launch and boat of the hostile frigate, which she had 
just put overboard and was directed to cut of? two schoon- 
ers which were somewhat delayed behind the remainder 
of the convoy. As the wind continued to freshen, the gal- 
ley sent a boat with the ensign and ten men of his garri- 
son to re-enforce the aforesaid schooners. In fact, the 
launches of the Englishman had come alongside to board, 
but were by the help of the officer and ten men just men- 
tioned, formally beaten off in the three attempts that they 
made. In this afifair we suffered no damage, except that 
Don Francisco Molina, the lieutenant of the militia of Gua- 
nabacoa, was wounded in the thigh. The hostile ship, see- 
ing that her launches had not succeeded in their attempt, 
now directed them to attack the Saint Augustine bilander 
and the launch from the convoy sent by the commanding 
officer of the galley to support the vessels that were far 
astern. Although the utmost defense possible had been 
made, they were unable to resist the fire of the ship which 
was at anchor in three fathoms of water, and so ran ashore, 
the sub-lieutenant, Don Domingo de la Cruz, having been 
killed in the action by a gun-shot, as well as the corporal, 
Manuel del Pino, by another. When they saw our people 
had got ashore, the enemy leaving their boat, swarmed 
over the bilander in order to loot the cargo which they 
supposed she carried. From the shore, we opened fire on 
them, encouraged by seeing that the English boat had sunk 
in the surf on the shore, and assisted by two Indians who 
happened to be fishing, and who had come up at the sound 


of the guns. We succeeded in overcoming our adversaries 
who, after a moment or two of struggle, asked for quarter. 
Of the English in the boat, six were wounded and nine un- 
hurt. The ship when it saw her people captured set sail. 
The dragoons who went to the help of the bilander were 
clever enough on going ashore to take their arms with 
them and from the shore diverted the hostile launches, 
so as to permit the artillerymen also to go ashore. With- 
out this, the affair would not have succeeded. The prison- 
ers have been brought to this place and among them, the 
officer in command, who is a brother of Captain Makay. 
From these we learned all about the fight and that the ship 
is one of the men-of-war of Carolina. I have had word 
of mouth with one of them but have learned nothing more 
than what we already know. In respect of the condition 
of affairs in Saint Augustine, I also learned that the day; 
before our arrival a schooner had allowed itself to be sight- 
ed on the north and that she had changed her course as 
soon as she had seen the seven vessels at anchor. At one 
o'clock of the afternoon, the second in command, Don Fran- 
cisco de la Peiia and I went ashore, and we passed the rest 
of the day informing ourselves of the state of the prepara- 
tions of this place. 

June 16th. 

Today we convened the pilots, white as well as Indian, 
and examined them carefully in regard to everything we 
should know for the purpose of our expedition. Later we 
held council, the commanding officers and the naval en- 
sign, Don Francisco de la Pena, in which we agreed upon 
the method of attacking the north and south entrances of 
St. Simon's in order to cut off the communication between 
the various stations of the enemy, deciding to detach th'^ee 
galliots with their canoes to the more northerly entrance 
and two to enter by the Bar of Whales ; these two to post 
themselves within the river between the Fort of St, An- 
drew and Frederica. Today we had squalls from the north- 
east and more or less water was sent on board, in spite of 
the fact that all the launches were busy unloading stores. 

June 17th. 

Another council was held between the commanding of- 
ficers and Don Francisco de la Peua, in which was discuss- 
ed the question of *:he point at which we should disembark 


to invade the Isle of St. Simon ; and after various reflect- 
ions upon the matter, and weighing all the circumstances 
with the greatest attention, it was unanimously agreed that 
the disembarkation should take place on the east coast at 
the most sheltered point of the shoals north of the Bar of 
Gualquini and that from this point a cordon should be form- 
ed with part of the troops to reach as far as the careening 
ground in order to maintain free communication within 
the river with our ships and to receive supplies and what- 
ever else might be needful from that point in full security. 
It was further agreed that the ships and the remaining 
vessels should enter in good order and force the hostile 
battery, and should string themselves across the river of 
the harbor in the formation to be prescribed by the senior 
naval officer, Don Antonio Castaneda, and that afterward 
operations should conform to the turn of events. 

I caused lists to be given to me of the troops, the con- 
victs, the Indians and the negroes of the garrison, the first 
being composed of five pickets of the re-enforcement and 
of one of the garrison, well equipped ; of ninety convicts, 
of fifty-five Indians and of fifteen negroes, all armed. Then 
I promptly made the lists of distribution of all these classes 
according to the capacity and quality of the vessels and 
they were so allotted. 

We continued today sending as much water as we could 
on board, having regard to the necessities of the vessels 
and especially those of the royal frigates. Today we had 
squalls from the northeast and some of them gave us real 
concern, by preventing communication and because our 
vessels were so completely exposed out beyond the bar. 
Our arrangements were thus delayed. 

Today we saw a schooner off in the north and the com- 
manding officer Don Antonio Castaneda, made signal to the 
Honduran ship to chase her, and after some time, she de- 
clared herself to be English and put her boat overboard 
and sent it to us with the French captain who was captur- 
ed on this bar at the beginning of March of this year, with 
three Spanish prisoners and a negro of Espinosa's. Don 
Diego Ogletorp was returning these people with a letter 
to the Governor of St. Augustine, with directions to leave 
these prisoners at that place. I learned from the French 
captain that the schooner in which he had come is the same 
that was seen on the fourteenth ; that on account of the bad 
weather she had not approached the shore to carry out the 


order of Oglettorp and that having recognized our sloop, 
the English captain had taken the resolution to leave 
aboard of her both the French captain and the prisoners. 
These declared that they had been kept confined and de- 
prived of all communication. The French captain, a rea- 
sonably just, fair man, had been kept on board of the bi- 
lander which, from the description he gave, is the one from 
this place which they captured after it had come to anchor 
in the river of St. Simon. He was not permitted to set foot 
on shore more than twice, when he was taken before a 
Board, presided over by a Doctor, to make a declaration in 
respect of certain effects and bilanders. These he lost, for 
the verdict was adverse although it was established that he 
had come to bring supplies to the garrison. In spite of the 
closeness of the confinement in which he was kept, they 
nevertheless treated him with the greatest distrust as 
though he had been an enemy. He understood that Oglet- 
torp had not the forces to resist ours because, all told, they 
have not more than six hundred English, divided between 
troops and farmers, and that these are distributed in differ- 
ent posts. He relates further that the battery of the city or 
town of Frederica is dismounted and he reports the deep 
poverty in which they are living, without fresh meat, the sol- 
diers without money and without any relief, except that a 
French officer has a few sheep and cattle. The negro of 
Espinosa, however, enjoyed a little liberty and says that a 
storm and heavy rains have gradually destroyed the battery 
at the entrance of Gualquini, so that he saw it, at least so he 
says, fallen over on one side. On asking the French captain 
what opinion Oglettorp's people had formed on seeing our 
seven vessels anchored in front of the bar, he said, that 
they thought it was the privateer, Estrada (who has as yet 
not come in from his cruise), with a few prizes; and that 
the captain of the English man-of-war, whom a few days 
before he had met, had told them of the combat which he 
had had with our galley and the boats of the first division, 
and that he had given them an account of the prisoners 
which the Spaniards had taken from them at the Bar of 
Mosquitos, telling them that they had come with stores 
for the garrison escorted by the galley; so that it seems 
they have not perceived the purpose for which our expedi- 
tion is intended. The letter of Oglettorp to the Governor 
reduces itself to communicating to him the fact that he 
is returning the prisoners aforementioned, claiming credit 


for having rescued them from the power of the Indians 
who had captured them ; and to saying that the others which 
he holds in his power must, by order of the king, his mas- 
ter, be sent to London, Don Romualdo Morales being of the 
number; and makes frivolous excuses for not having before 
given an answer to our Governor. 

June 18th. 

We drew up plans of battle, divided the troops into col- 
umns, and selected the reserve ; the three naval lieutenants, 
Don Vicentte Quintta, Don Carlos Regio, and the Mar- 
quess de Casinas, were appointed to take over as many 
other pickets* belonging to the Captains Don Bernardo 
Quena and Don Gregorio Bermejo, on duty as regimental 
staff captains,** and that of Don Francisco Palafox, chos- 
en as aide-de-camp by the commanding general. Ballast 
was sent out to the frigate, Escalera, assigned to the fleet 
by direction of the commanding general and in agreement 
with his royal officers and the agents of the Royal Ex- 
chequer. Besides we continued to send out water and I 
made a distribution of cartridges, at the rate of twenty 
rounds for the disembarkation, and ordered them to be 
distributed to each vessel by the adjutants. f I also ordered 
the issue of 183 muskets and bayonets to the militia but 
these orders could not all be carried out because there was 
not time during this day on account of the great distance to 
be covered and because the tide did not serve. The supply 
of water has continued and the ballast for the frigate of 
Escalera. I ordered the negro of Espinosa to be held a 
prisoner with directions that he should be allowed to speak 
to no one because I suspected some knavery. 

• The piqitete at the beginning of the XVIII century, was a provisional 
and temporary company forming up on the left, and made up of men drawn 
from all the companies. Later In the text it has its regular meaning of 
picket, 1. e. guard. 

•* Sargentos maiores, [or mayores, in modem form]. The sargento 
mayor was charged with duties of administration, accountability, inspection 
and discipline. He took rank after the captains, but they nevertheless were 
under his orders in matters relating to his office. The title is rather that of 
an office than of a grade. There is no English equivalent. 

t Aytidantes, in all probability the assistants of the sargentos mayores, 
•who were called ayxuiantes. The term used in the translation "adjutant," 
must not be taken to mean what we actually understand by it in the military 
service, but is used In a more general way. Strictly speaking we have no 
Bnglish equivalent for ayudante, any more than we have for sargento mayor. 


June 19th. 

I have drawn up the order of disembarkation and the 
stores have been transported to the frigate of Escalera for 
the troops which are embarking-, namely, the detachment 
of Don Gregorio Aldana, The schooner, Guaraia, has suc- 
ceeded in entering this port. It has on board a part of the 
supply of stores for the schooners and other vessels of 
the garrison [of Saint Augustine]. The baggage of the 
officers of the pickets has been ordered on board, and the 
supply of water and ballast to the boats has continued with 
the greatest energy, each of these being about completed. 

Today we saw a schooner to which chase was given, by 
order of the senior naval officer, by the bilander of Fide 
and the Honduran. They did not succeed in overtaking 
it, but we have formed the opinion that it is the same one 
which brought the Frenchman and prisoners sent by Ogle- 
torp and that it has come to spy us out and observe our 

June 20th. 

While we were completing the distribution of stores, I 
passed the day writing to the Captain General of Havana, 
giving his Excellency an account of all that had passed up 
to the present day. Orders have been given for the em- 
barkation tomorrow afternoon of the troops of the garri- 
son, and that they should set out at the first tide and come 
to anchor near the flagship, in order that each may receive 
its sailing instructions from the naval commander and 
that there may be nothing more to do than to put to sea. 
Today we saw a brigantine which we have decided must 
be that of Estrada, because it seems suspicious that so large 
a vessel off this bar could have disappeared. We are copy- 
ing out the order of disembarkation in order that each one 
of the vessels may have its own copy. 

June 21st. 

Yesterday we finished supplying the vessels of the garri- 
son with their proper stores. The watering of the ships, 
too, has been finished. At dawn, we saw a brigantine 
which we decided to be the same as that seen yesterday; 
and in fact, at one o'clock of the afternoon it anchored oflF 
our bar, and we discovered it to be that of Estrada. At six of 
the afternoon the ship's writer came ashore with a letter 
from the said Estrada, giving us an account of what had 
happened on his cruise. He reports having captured a 


schooner of rice which has already arrived here and a packet 
boat, and reports further having been attacked by a 
Carolina war vessel on the third instant at about six of 
the afternoon, when the combat opened ; that it lasted un- 
til midnight and that each damaged the other more or less, 
with the loss on the part of the Spaniards of one man killed 
and four wounded; among them, the captain in the hand^ 
the lieutenant in the head, and two sailors. As for the loss 
of the English, he knew nothing. He judges merely that 
the damage must have been great because the fire of all 
sorts which he opened on him was incessant, and because 
the Englishman, dropping astern, was the first to cease 
the combat, so that this action may be compared to that 
which Don Pedro Goycochea had with the English frigate 
between the islands of San Domingo and Porto Rico, be- 
cause the circumstances were almost the same. He also 
says that he has learned from prisoners that two hundred 
sailors have been sent from Boston to re-enforce the fleet 
of Admiral Vernon which it is known was occupied, ac- 
cording to current reports, before Cartagena; and that it 
was common rumor that additional forces were to come 
out to join those of Oglettorp and that if these should 
arrive, he would doubtless use them before St. Augustine ; 
that Carolina was not of a mind to give the help which 
Oglettorp was seeking, unless there should be some order 
from the King to that effect, and the command of the 
expedition committed to some other chief. 

The brigantine comes in short of meat and for that rea- 
son cannot form part of the convoy ; only as soon as it shall 
have entered, we shall try to shift its arms and equipment 
to the guard schooner, and if Captain Estrada shall have re- 
covered from his wound, we shall give him the command 
of her. This night we had squalls, winds and showers. 

June 22nd. 

Frequent rains, squalls and thunderstorms have today 
impeded the embarkation of the troops, nor was Estrada's 
brigantine able to come in ; and as the horizons indicated 
foul weather, all the pilots were assembled and gave their 
opinion that the vessels should not set out, but should re- 
main until tomorrow when the embarkation would take 
place and the ships put forth, but only if the weather 
should be good. 

In a gazette from Boston, brought by Estrada, there is 
a ridiculous article as follows : It says that a gentleman, 


of Georgia, who had arrived in Boston on the 26th of 
March, had given trustworthy news that General Oglet- 
torp with eight hundred men had gone to lay siege to St. 
Augustine, that among these men he had three hundred 
Indians who had resolved to burn the place; and he added 
that the motive of Ogleltorp's expedition was that he had 
got news that the Spaniards were weak and in great need 
of stores, caused by the presence of Admiral Vernon's 
fleet in the waters of Cuba. 

June 23rd. 
Although we had thought that today we could set forth, 
the morning dawned with a strong wind from the north- 
east, accompanied by squalls and showers, and the water 
on the bar had become so rough that it was impossible to 
cross it; notwithstanding which two attempts were made, 
in order to bring in the brigantine of Estrada, which is 
causing us concern, on account of its bad condition. It 
fired a few guns of distress but it was not possible to 
reach it. At ten of the morning, we had the unhappy 
news that Father Domingo, chaplain of the packet boat 
"Diligente," and a sailor of its crew, who were going on 
board, had been drowned at the exit of the bar, but that 
fortunately the vicar general of the expedition had mirac- 
ulously saved his life by happily seizing hold of the launch 
and keeping himself on it until she came ashore. We have 
also seen ashore on the beach a boat without knowing 
which boat it is, nor how many people have been drowned. 
This afternoon it became calm so that the Commanding 
General assembled the commanding officers and naval 
officers and the pilots of the garrison, and requested that 
each should give his opinion in respect of our sallying 
forth, as it was important that our trip should be short, 
and clear that the inconveniences of delay would be se- 
rious; in general, each person should give reasons for and 
against. The pilots were unanimous in declaring that it 
was not possible to cross the bar as long as the sea was 
still up, aritated as it was by the squalls and wind that 
had prevailed. After various reflections on the subject, 
and after taking into account the fact that the small boats, 
which were to follow the fleet without losing land from 
view were absolutely necessary to the success of our op- 
erations, and therefore should not expose themselves to 
separation from the convoy, on account of the contrary 
v/inds that had been blowing, and the great variation of 


the weather, and considering further that the journey 
from this point to the hostile coast was so short, it was de- 
cided to be absolutely necessary that we should set out in 
settled weather. Accordingly, all minds were of the opin- 
ion that we should wait until things were safe and that if 
the wind should shift tomorrow we should go out. With 
this opinion, the order was given that at the beat of the 
drum everyone should go on board his ship. 

[End of Arredondo's Journal.] 



Colonel Don Francisco Rubiani and the Engineer-in- 
Chief, Don Antonio Arredondo, were immediately put 
ashore and set to work to draw up the plan of battle, giv- 
ing at the same time directions to provide the vessels with 
water. As, on account of the distance and difficulty of 
crossing the bar, the dispatch desirable in this case is al- 
most impossible, our departure has been greatly delayed. 
Moreover, we wished to wait in order to determine the 
effects of the moon, in respect of which, an unfavorable 
forecast had been made. 

The intervening time was spent, however, in inspecting 
all the tools and implements and ammunition brought by 
the vessels of the convoy for the purpose of adding to them, 
if necessary, from those in the garrison, and so it was dis- 
covered that the nine hundred water jars were defective, 
which it was decided to repair along with the smaller ves- 
sels of all the ships. On the 26th the pickets of this garri- 
son embarked, 600 strong, after the Lord Bishop had preach- 
ed them a sermon. On the 28th the commanding officers 
went on board, but a strong wind having come out of the 
west-northwest, and maintained itself until the 30th, the 
smaller boats, such as launches, pirogues and galliots, 
which carried water for only four days, were compelled 
to return to shore to renew their supply. This de- 
layed our departure, which finally took place the first of 
July at 7 :00 in the morning, with wind east-southeast. We 
had determined in orders and arranged that the disembar- 
kation should take place outside of the Port of Gualquini, 
and beyond the range of its guns, but in consequence of the 


representations made by Don Antonio CastaSeda and of the 
excellent reasons he gave in favor of the advantage of forc- 
ing the port, orders were given to this end. The convoy 
was composed of fifty-two vessels, which remained together 
only the following day, because the wind coming on from 
the west-northwest, with considerable force and raising 
a considerable sea, four galliots and the pirogues were 
compelled to seek the shelter of the coast as best they 
could ; and as the wind held with great tenacity in the west, 
north and the northwest, and as there were frequent 
squalls, it resulted that various vessels were separated 
from the convoy; of these, two pirogues filled with In- 
dians and convicts succeeded in returning and were taken 
in tow ; one by the pink, San Lorenzo, and the other by 
the frigate of Flecha. 

On the 9th, having made land at sunset and the wind 
having fallen, we cast anchor in fourteen fathoms of water 
at which time we heard two cannon shots and at the change 
of countersign, two more, which helped us set our course 
for the nearest point to the Port of Gualquini, otherwise 
known as St. Simon. 

At half past four of the afternoon on the 10th, we an- 
chored in ten fathoms about two leagues from the coast 
and about three to the north of the port. All the vessels 
had arrived so short of water that in some of them only a 
pint could be given out ; there being none among the thir- 
ty-three which had succeeded in anchoring in these waters 
which could giA^e any help unless it was the flagship and 
the packet boat, Avhich was ordered to make a return of its 
water supply with orders to give none out. Water was 
issued every day by the flagship in half rations. 

The enemy made a show at various times of sallying 
forth from the port as far as the range of the guns of their 
castle. Five bilanders would come out and anchor and 
then return after a short time. In these attempts or ob- 
servations they passed the entire afternoon as well as in 
firing various guns, which we inferred was for the purpose 
of testing their batteries. We, ourselves, did nothing else 
but send out Don Antonio Arredondo in the boat of the 
flagship to reconnoiter the shore and make soundings in 
order to determine if our vessels could get closer in shore, 
and thus facilitate the disembarkation, in case we should 
find it convenient to attempt it here. Having noticed be- 
fore sunset that a launch had set out from the port and was 

Tills map lepioduced from tlie original in the 
rosscssioii of W. ,r. DcKeniie, Wormsloe, Ga. 


pressing forward under sail and oar in the direction of our 
flagship, she ran up the English ensign and pennants, the 
other vessels of the convoy doing the same thing, but 
nothing came of it, for in a short time the aforesaid launch 
retired. At 8:00 in the evening, the launch of the packet 
boat having met the boat of the flagship which had sallied 
forth for the purpose of sounding, they fired on each other 
until a mutual recognition caused the fire to be stopped, 
fortunately without any damage having occurred on either 
side. During this night, we heard from time to time a few 
hostile c?nnon shots of the enemy. 

On the 11th, the galley joined and a bilander, one of 
those which had fallen out of the convoy, as well as a 
barge. The wind continuing fresh from the W. W. S. W. 
and S. W. with frequent squalls and high seas, prevented 
our entrance. Our desire to execute this movement in- 
creased with the complaints of the lack of water. This 
want was met in the manner already given, for no water 
could be got from the shore, as the enemy observed our 
every movement, and we should have exposed ourselves 
to loss. This day nothing special occurred, unless it was 
the usual gun shots at the change of countersign and guard 
mounting: there were some others too during the course 
of the day. 

On the 12th, the day dawned fair and so the command- 
ing general set the signal to begin the disembarkation. 
With this end in view, a few boats with troops on board 
set out to take a position astern of the flagship, when 
there came up a squall so violent that it was only with 
much labor and difficulty that the vessels were able to re- 
sume their positions. We now recognized that any wind 
from the outside, even one blowing only a short time, rais- 
ed a great sea and surf ; that we were compelled to keep our 
vessels at a great distance from shore because there was 
not sufficient water closer in for the larger ones ; further, 
that the absence of the launches, boats and pirogues from 
the garrison of St. Augustine as well as of the four gal- 
liots which the v/eather had separated from us, made an or- 
derly landing impossible. Therefore, Don Antonio Cas- 
taiieda announced it as his opinion that the port should be 
forced, adding to the excellent reasons already given, the 
no less excellent consideration that our vessels were in 
strong peril and exposed to some fatal damage, in conse- 
quence of the severity of the season which gave us no hope 


of anything but bad weather. In consequence, it was de- 
termined to force the port and to wait for this purpose 
for suitable weather. The winds continued west-south- 
west and west, with great strength and tenacity, raising 
a heavy sea and accompanied by squalls until the fifteenth, 
when we hoisted anchor to challenge the fort. The wind 
having fallen, we anchored closer in, having gained some- 
thing like two leagues. Until that particular day, noth- 
ing special occurred unless it was the continued clamor 
for water, a need that was met by the flagship and the 
packet boat. The enemy continued his practice of firing 
his guns at the change of the countersign, when they 
mounted the guard, except the fourteenth day, when from 
ten in the evening until eleven, many flashes were seen on 
the beach and from eleven till twelve many cannon shots 
were heard, as many as fifty having been counted. Con- 
siderable doubt existed as to what could have occasioned 
so unusual a thing, but according to the best of our infer- 
ences, we decided that it must be our four galliots cannon- 
ading Fort San Pedro. 


July 16th. 

At seven in the morning, the entire convoy hoisted an- 
chor, and as there was not water enough, anchored at the 
entrance of the port at a distance of a league and a half to 
wait until the tide should rise and thus make the entrance 
surer. The galley and two galliots accordingly were or- 
dered to sound the channel and while so employed were 
fired on by the enemy. This fire they returned without 
having received any damage. They then withdrew, having 
been recalled by the commanding general at three in the 
afternoon, because now we had had two days of a growing 
tide with a fresh wind astern and a smooth sea. We sailed 
straight into the harbor, following the pre-arranged order, 
and using as buoys the galley and the galliots which had 
been sent forward for this purpose. These, as soon as the 
flagship had passed them, used all diligence to get in closer 


and open fire under the guns of the fort, and of a man- 
of-war schooner, and of four bilanders which were eche- 
loned out from it. From this time, the enemy began to 
answer, maintaining the fire with the greatest intensity 
from the time the flagship entered until the last vessel 
passed. This vessel was the pink of Parreiio, which unfor- 
tunately had gone aground under the fire of the enemy, 
who continued to fire incessantly during the time of one 
sand glass; but the tide rising, the boat got off, having lost 
only one man killed and three wounded and received much 
damage in its hull and two cannon shots between wind and 
water. The whole convoy was at anchor inside the har- 
bor at half after five of the afternoon, and it was discov- 
ered that the total damage received in the rest of it was 
confined to the pink of Acosta, three men killed and one 
wounded; to the pink hospital, Lieut. De Berroa wounded; 
in the bilander, one wounded; in the galley, three. In a 
few vessels some of the foremen had been cut down and 
the bilander of Don Pedro de La Madrid had had its mast 
shot away. As we feared that the enemy might during 
this night bring up some guns, and after constructing a 
battery on the shore opposite the point where the vessels 
were anchored, do them some damage, we decided to land 
the troops immediately, to w^hich end the commanding 
general at six o'clock set a signal. It being now after sun- 
set, as many as eighteen boats, most of them very small, 
now pushed off from the flagship. Some of these contain- 
ed only six men each, because the sea and wind being con- 
trary allowed no more.* The three barges, however, 
brought off the companies of grenadiers, but these came 
last of all on account of the struggle against contrary winds 
and tides, landing three hours after every one else. This 
first landing of 500 men was commanded by Lieutenant 
Colonel Don Antonio Salgado. There was no resistance, 
but on account of the night there was some disorder which 
may always be expected on such occasions. Fifty men, 
all told, had disembarked by seven in the evening, the rest 
having come on immediately afterward, except the men in 
the launches. After setting foot ashore, the troops formed 
up in three ranks, throwing out advanced sentinels and 

• These words are followed In the MS. by the expression "en los cortcu- 
bufjxies". The meaning of this compound word is unknown; the word Itself 
can be found in no Spanish dictionary. In copying it, the scribe has roada 
an erasure, as though he were not sure himself of the original. 


posting a few pickets in advantageous positions. The 
movement was supported by the galley, galliots and packet 
boat, which before the boats took on the men, swept the 
shore and beach with their fire, and the immediate point 
where the landing was to be, maintaining the fire until 
the men had gone ashore. At ten o'clock came the com- 
panies of grenadiers ; and at half past eleven the command- 
ing general, Don Manuel Montiano; the second in com- 
mand, Don Francisco Rubiani ; and the Chief of Staff and 
Engineer-in-Chief' Don Antonio Arredondo. At this time 
there must have been ashore about a thousand men who, 
as they continued to arrive, formed up, as already stated. 
Between ten and twelve, we saw a few fires started by the 
enemy, which as far as we could make out, seemed to be 
three bilanders and something else larger. From the great 
blaze which arose, we thought this last must be some pow- 
der magazine which they had blown up. At this hour,, 
came the Indians who had been sent out to reconnoiter. 
These declared that they had entered a few houses at some 
distance from the fort but had found them unoccupied; 
they brought back with them a few trifles, such as dishes 
and fruit. Nothing especial occurred this night, nor did 
we undertake any movement, nor did we observe anything 
else on the part of the enemy, than what has already been 
set forth. This disembarkation continued until daylight. 

July 17th. 

At two, we sent out the Indians again. They returned at 
four, with the news that the enemy had abandoned the fort 
and bringing back with them a few weapons and some mer- 
chandise from a bilander, which the enemy had left loaded 
with supplies of some value. The companies of grenadiers 
were now sent out to occupy the said fort, and at six o'clock 
the entire body took up the march along the beach where 
we recognized the three bilanders that had been burnt, 
whose cargo must have consisted of flour and meat, be- 
cause we found many barrels on the beach. These stores 
however profited but few, for in their keen desire to find 
stuff of any value whatever, the Indians had spoiled them ; 
recognizing that the same thing had happened to the armed 
bilander at the hands of the said Indians as well as of 
the sailors who had sacked it, an officer was detached with 
a guard to preserve whatever he could, and orders were 
given to the agent of the exchequer to make an inventory 

Chart for tlu- Miilr;iiu\' 
(i:ialc|uiiii. River of Saint Sim 
iMii- in north hitituih- M 

l.cijcnd — 
A. t'hatnu'l h'.ulint; o\ rr the h; 


its depth in fathom 2* (Unii 

ishcs to 3 at half tide. 
JV SottlemciU fortiliod hy ;i li; 

tcry of 16 guns, 8-pouncltM i, 

and 1 1 liouscs of hoards ui \ 

palms, called Fort Krodcric L 
(. The River of Saint Sinn n 

leading to the town of l-'re |. 

] ), Careening ground. | 

J.; ** Koad joinin.i;- tlu- sittij 

ment and careening groii 
]■ I'. Tidal inlets. 
(I. River leading to the Bar it' 

1 I. Inland of Saint Sinmn. 
1.. Ishmd of Sparrow ll.iwk- ot 

of Whales. 
M. Sawmill of the hji^H^li 
NX. Water, good hut turhid. 
< >. Look out made of logs. . 
1'. I'.akery. | 

* This S) inhol delird inl 
pretation; it does not appe.ii 
the chart. 

■ The letter V. does not api'«.i 
on the chart ; prol, ' '■■ 'hi's error. 

This m:'.]) is one-foni ■'' 

a tracing of the origin.' 1 nia;i ii 
llie Spanish .\rchi\-es at Srvill. 

/.iXntd of t/ic Sca!(- — 


o 50 f> 

I Toises. 

Duplicate. Havana, M.i 

Don .\ntonio de .\n. <'. nd" 

This map rcpriMlcici-il from llii' nri-aiMl in II 
possi.-ssit)ii ,)f \V. .1. lii'Kcniie, Woniisl, 


of whatever should be found. Similarly, on finding that 
the schooner and man-of-war had succeeded in escaping 
during the night, the naval commander, Don Antonio Cas- 
taiieda placed the captain of the galley, Don Domingo de la 
Cron, under arrest, for having failed to execute the order 
given him to approach the man-of-war as soon as the land- 
ing should have taken place, and fire upon him during the 
rest of the night in order to prevent his escape. We found 
on the beach an Englishman badly wounded in the back by 
a gunshot, who said that he was the captain of the bilander 
that had a cargo. He declared that Obletorp had retired 
to Frederica with five hundred men and that he himself 
could give no account of Frederica because he had never 
been there, since it was only a few days since he anchored 
in Gualquini. This prisoner was sent on board the hospital 
ship to be cured. 

The troops had now got up to the fort and orders were 
given to reach the northern entrance by marching under 
the cover of some tall and thick live oaks found here and 
also of the plantations or settlements of neat houses which 
surround the neighborhood. The soldiers were forbid- 
den under pain of death to go more than two hundred paces 
beyond their posts. Inside the fort, we found another 
Englishman, a sailor, who could give no more account of 
things than the wounded man. We also found another 
man dead, killed by our Indians, who, according to their 
custom, had scalped him. These declared that they had 
done this because he had resisted them with his sword. 
The fort is made wholly of earth, composed of four cur- 
tains, with a salient in the midst of each. It has a ditch 
and a good stockade with a glacis, and on the glacis, joined 
to the stockade, a parapet of barrels filled with earth. 
There were besides a few huts and some large magazines, 
one of which had been blown up, for we came upon three 
burnt eighteen-pounders, imperfectly spiked, whose car- 
riages were of such especial construction and so well de- 
signed that two men sufficed to maneuver them ; one of 
these had been dismounted by a cannon shot from one of 
our vessels. We also found six six-pounders, five of 
which had been imperfectly spiked, and one left unspiked ; 
and inside of a budge-barrel 190 loaded handgrenades, and 
a number of musket balls ; among the remains of the mag- 
azines that had been burnt, we found various kinds of iron 
wares, shovels, picks and some barrel hoops. 


From the fort to a block house, which is at the entrance 
of the harbor, there is a level stretch of country, more or 
less elevated, v/hich commands and looks out on the beach, 
and the rim or entrance of the woods. This stretch could 
contain eight or ten thousand men. Here we found six 
lines of houses in the form of a camp ; among these were 
sixty distant only one pace from one another. These we 
were able to save, because we succeeded in preventing dis- 
order on the part of the soldiers who, without having re- 
ceived orders to that effect, had set fire to sixty other 
houses along the lines just spoken of and to four magazines 
of supplies. The block house is made of earth with a body 
of oyster shell, whitewashed and resembling stone work. 
It is composed of two curtains, and of an arc of circle on 
the side which overlooks the entrance of the port. In it 
we found a shell mortar, nine burnt-out handgrenades, a 
magazine and some huts, in whose remains we found a 
few grenades, bullets and other ammunition. Beyond this 
house, at a short distance and in front of it, had been con- 
structed a battery. This battery overlooked the entrance 
of the port and mounted six guns, left unspiked, four six- 
pounders and two four-pounders. In the sack of the 
houses, of the camp and of the plantations, there had been 
some disorder, as is usually the case on these occasions, in 
consequence of which we lost some cattle and goats and 
considerable quantities of rich wines, oils, beer, fine but- 
ter, cheeses and other delicacies, to say nothing of a great 
supply of hard tack, salt meat and flour. These, which 
had been all burnt, might have been very useful for our 
maintenance. We continued our march to the terrain be- 
tween the two forts where we took up a formation in the 
shape of a hammer, sending from this point two guards, 
one to each fort ; and having announced to the troops that 
whenever there was a call-to-arms, the site just mentioned 
should be the assembling point, orders were given to re- 
turn to the sixty houses which we had found in the camp. 

July 18th. 

At six in the morning, Don Sebastian Sanchez, with one 
of the companies of the garrison of St, Augustine and a 
picket of forty men was sent out to reconnoiter the road 
to the careening ground, as he was considered well fitted 
idt this duty. Similarly Don Nicholas Herndndez with 
twenty-five men of his company and the forty Indian 


scouts,* was dispatched along- the road through the coun- 
try to Frederica, the purpose being to select, according 
to the infc)rmation they should bring back, the best direc- 
tion in which to attack that town. 

At 8 o'clock we found a dragoon dead at the edge of the 
woods, and some other people who were accustomed to use 
in these parts, brought the news of having found one of 
our Indians dead. As some hostile Indians also brought in 
this news, and we ourselves heard shots fired in the wood, 
the troops stood to arms and orders were given to send 
out two pickets as outposts. At ten o'clock, came a sol- 
dier sent by Don Sebastian Sanchez with the report that 
he had found a very narrow trail, and that Don Antonio 
Barba, who was in command of the reconnoitering party 
had succeeded in going, say two leagues, and that nearly 
the entire trail was nothing but a path passing through 
thick woods, leading at intervals into a few savannahs or 
clearings of a swampy nature, and going across on a cause- 
way made of brush wood no wider than the trail ; that 
thus, no formation whatever was possible nor any manner 
of march than single file because any one leaving the 
brush wood would be mired ; and he reported further that 
two miquelets** and a corporal with two Indians whom they 
had found and carried on with them, and four grenadiers, 
had noticed on the path something novel, consisting of a 
cut-log stockade, and also here and there some brush wood 
arranged like a parapet, none of which they had observed 
before. He, therefore, halted to reconnoiter the place, and 
at the same time they began to fire on him from the right 
and the left without his being able to see anything more 
than the flash of discharge. This fire he undertook to re- 
turn for more than one hour without knowing whom he 
was engaged with because of the thickness of the forest. 
He continued firing until he had used up all his ammunition 
and then retired in good order, so as not to have his retreat 
cut oft", seeing that the ground gave all the advantage to 
the enemy. In this action, the two companies lost seven 
men killed and eleven wounded ; among the killed, the 
ensign of the company of Havana, Don Miguel Rucardi. 
The militia suffered no loss, because they formed the rear 
guard, which was not reached by the fire of the enemy. 

• Desplay adores, the word is not found In the dictionaries. 

•• According to Spanish authorities, the miquolet is the ancestor of the 
modern scout. 


On receiving this news, the troops stood to arms and con- 
tinued from this night to sleep on them in hammer-like for- 
mation. Two other advance outposts were turned out and 
their reserves indicated for each one. 

On this day, we noticed a few pirogues going about with 
people of the island on board. They were waiting to pass 
through the channel that goes to Frederica. We sent out 
a little boat with six sailors through this channel to get 
water, but they were all killed by hostile Indians. 

July 19th. 

At six, the Indians were sent out to reconnoiter the for- 
est and to see if they could find some other road through 
it to Frederica. At 9:00 we sent out a small boat with 
eight men to obtain water in a lagoon at a short distance 
from the shore and on the edge of the woods and not more 
than half a cannon shot from our camp. Two of these 
men were killed by hostile Indians and the remainder fled 
precipitately to our camp. The sailors who were on the 
shore withdrew when they heard the shots so close, where- 
upon we beat to arms and sent out two pickets, one of 
grenadiers along the beach, and the other through the 
woods. We also gave an order to the galley to come up 
close and fire on them. But all these orders were at once 
cancelled because the Indians had already withdrawn. At 
12:00 our people returned without having discovered any 
other road than the narrow one, and without having seen 
any enemy. Having heard that pirogues of the Island 
of Frederica had been seen plying back and forth, Indians 
were sent out, who returned saying that there were no 
people in it, and that they had burnt houses which they 
had entered and took to be hospitals, because there were 
many beds and mattresses and a few saddles which they 
brought back. During the entire day eight or ten re- 
turned, miquelets, and a few wounded from the picket 
of Sdnchez, besides a few disabled by the rough character 
of the woods ; and also a few Indians who had been missing, 
but not one of whom had suffered any harm because they 
returned in complete health. All announced that they 
had seen Captain Sanchez beaten with blows and taken 
prisoner: that they knew nothing of the captain of the 
miquelets, Herndndez. 


July 20th. 

At 2 :00 in the morning, the captain of miquelets, Don 
Nicholas Hernrmdez, came to our camp ; confirming the in- 
formation just given, he declared that he had tried to 
escape from the enemy by leaving the trail and hiding in the 
woods, but that in a short time he ran into two men who 
made him prisoner, but that he had succeeded in freeing 
himself from them because he recognized that they were 
somewhat careless, and the hope inspired by this, gave 
such an impulse to his valor that he succeeded in carrying 
out the extreme resolution of killing them both. At 6:00 
we sent out the Indians to reconnoiter the woods and to 
find some other road to Frederica. We began to demolish 
the forts and to carry their guns on board, and considering 
the serious inconveniences resulting from not having com- 
pleted our water supply through the risk to which it ex- 
posed our people, and that we had no buckets in the neigh- 
borhood of the camp or the castles, for which reason we 
had lost eight men, we determined to make a sufficient 
number to give a supply to all in the ditch of the fort ; and 
so we have begun to complete our water supply. 

At 8 :00 o'clock, there took place a junta, at which were 
present Don Antonio de Castaneda, the captains of the 
grenadiers and of miquelets, to consider certain facts, such 
as the position of the trail and the dififiiculties of the for- 
ests. In view of the fact that they had decided, and 
especially the captain of miquelets, who understands wood- 
craft, that another road ought to be found, before un- 
dertaking to attack Frederica, and as all agreed that none 
other had been found, except the narrow one, and that an 
attack along this line was impracticable, it was decided 
to send the galley and the galliots on a reconnaissance 
through the channel that leads to Frederica, to see how 
much depth of water it held, and to find a point more suit- 
ed for the disembarkation, and further that the engineer 
from St. Augustine should go out on this business. 

At two of the afternoon there arrived at this port a 
schooner and one launch with one hundred men of the 
pickets of St. Augustine. These had been separated from 
the convoy by bad weather. As many as fifteen vessels 
had come together; among them, the four galliots under 
the command of the naval ensign, Don Francisco Pineda. 
He had arrived within sight of this port, and not meeting 
any of our vessels, which had within twenty-four hours 


been sent off by the staff officer who happened to be in 
command of that post,* he had considered it proper to main- 
tain himself in those waters and await news of the arrival 
of our convoy at Gualquini. On seeing that this news was 
delayed, he determined to send on the vessels already men- 
tioned,** to notify the commanding general of all these 
matters, and that in passing he had engaged Fort San 
Pedro for one hour; and that one of his galliots had been 
attacked by four large pirogues filled with troops, one of 
which he had sunk near the shore where her people suc- 
ceeded in saving themselves. 

At 4:00 of the afternoon the entire body of troops formed 
up for a review which was over at 6:00, when we posted 
anew the usual guards in the form which has always pre- 
vailed, namely, that of a hammer. At prayers we saw out 
on the beach in the neighborhood of the fort a few Indians, 
wherefore we strengthened its guard and marched out 
the supports to re-enforce the outposts ; our Indians sallied 
to explore but returned in two hours without having met 
anybody. During this night, there were two false alarms 
so that the entire body remained under arms. 

July 21st. 

At 5 :00 in the morning, we began to entrench the out- 
posts with barrels of earth on account of the repeated false 
alarms which kept the troops continuously anxious and 
because our camp had no protection whatever nor artil- 
lery. This had not been put ashore because we were await- 
ing from one day to another the arrangements to be made 
to march on Frederica. At 6:00 we sent out the Indians 
to explore the forests and at the same time we sent out a 
launch toward the Bar of Whales, ordering the naval ensign 
Don Francisco de Pineda to proceed by the interior chan- 
nel, sounding the passes as far as that port. The com- 
manding general had approved his conduct in the operations 
which he reported having undertaken with the convoy 
under his orders. 

• What post Is meant, there is no means of determining'. The original 
passage is more or less obscure in its references. The vessels mentioned 
are those reported, ante under date of the 3d, as being compelled to seek 
shelter under the coast. 

•• TTie schooner and launch. 


At 4:00 in the afternoon, the galley and the galliots re- 
turned from a reconnaissance of the passes leading to Fred- 
erica. These had gone out in the morning under the or- 
ders of Naval Lieutenant Don Adrian Cantein. He de- 
clared that the channel contained enough water for all the 
boats, but that at a little more than half tide, the least depth 
he had found was 20 spans, the three vessels entering on 
the same front ; that on arriving within cannon shot of 
Frederica they opened on him, apparently with four guns, 
eight-pounders, and fired 18 shots, all of which passed over 
his head, and four bombs so well aimed that they fell very 
close ; that there is a stretch to be reached only by passing 
within cannon range, but that beyond they would be shel- 
tered from fire, in a stretch of pine woods, clear, open, and 
level, large enough for the formation of a far greater num- 
ber of troops than ours ; but that he was in doubt whether 
the beach was firm enough for a landing because grass 
land was seen everywhere, and that because in this, quak- 
ing grass is usually found; that he was unable to examine 
into this matter because he noticed that a number of troops 
had passed in pirogues to the shore of the island and that 
they could have done him much harm by musketry fire, 
especially as he had received orders not to open fire him- 
self. Our Indians returned without finding anything in 
the woods, having been unable to catch a prisoner or a de- 
serter who could give us any light or any help toward 
forming any plans for the attack on Frederica with the 
accuracy that is desirable. 

July 22nd. 

Our Indians sallied forth at 6 :00 in the morning to re- 
connoiter the woods, according to daily custom. As doubt 
exists in our minds in respect of the firmness of the ground 
for the landing in the channels, we determined again to 
send out the galley and two galliots for the determination 
of this matter. The commanding general turned this mat- 
ter over to the senior naval ofificer, Don Antonio Castaileda 
for the next day. 

During the morning there came in a miquelet. whose 
declaration confirms the others: thirty-six men being 
missing so far of the two pickets ol Sanchez and Herndn- 
dez. This man told us that he had come along the beach, 
outside of the port, and that at a short distance from the 
entrance he found a trench with three loaded six-pounder 


guns ready to spike and that he thought this battery had 
been put up through fear lest we should disembark out- 
side. This day we had no false alarm, nor did anything 
special occur. The Indians returned like all the rest with- 
out having accomplished anything whatever, but we should 
not be astonished that they should refuse to expose them- 
selves, seeing that they are rich, for a few have more than 
six hundred dollars worth of loot. These are the only 
people who have succeeded in getting anything, being the 
first ones to engage in loot. 

July 23d. 

The junta or council appointed for the day did not take 
place because Don Antonio Castaileda was sick and it was 
put off until the following day. Today there was nothing 
especial. We continued demolishing the forts. 

July 24th. 
At 2:00 in the morning we were informed by our out- 
posts that they had heard four shots and at once we heard 
in our camp the noise of drums, for which reason our peo- 
ple stood to arms and we re-enforced the outposts. At 
3 :00 there came into our camp a deserter, a prisoner, of the 
French nation, who declared that Obletorpe had been 
marching the entire niglit with 500 men with the design of 
surprising us, and that having heard the shots which put 
our camp on its guard, he thought that he was discovered 
and therefore withdrew, beating his drums. During this 
time, the deserter succeeded in making his escape. He 
also told how he had been compelled to take arms and 
that the five hundred men were made up of two hundred 
regular troops, two hundred militia, fifty Indians and fifty 
sailors ; that he believed that the entire force in Frederica 
amounted to from nine hundred to one thousand men, and 
that help was expected from Boston, from which news 
had been received; that he [Oglethorpe] had sent all the 
women fifty leagues inland, and that in the affair with our 
two pickets, he had taken about twelve prisoners, among 
them. Captain St'inchez. At 8:00 in the morning, this 
prisoner was sent on board the Penelope. At the same 
time Don Antonio Arredondo held a conference with Don 
Antonio Castaiieda on this news and to propose action that 
could be most rapidly taken, after all our vessels should 
have taken on their water. 


Between 12 :00 o'clock and 1 :00 of this day, one or our 
outposts reported that five vessels had been seen to the 
north, apparently headed for the port. In a short time, 
we could make them out and having taken account of their 
build, seeing that they were only two or three leagues 
off, we saw that one was a frigate of thirty guns, and that 
there were two packet boats, a brigantine and a sloop. 
This, together with the occurrence of the morning (al- 
though this, like the arrival of the French prisoner and his 
declarations, was considered an artifice), caused us to fear 
not so much what Avas involved, nor the vessels in sight, 
as the vessels which might follow in greater force. These 
reflections were held to justify our resolution to withdraw, 
which was forthwith carried out in the best form and order 
possible. After having collected everything in the camp 
without leaving anything that had been disembarked, the 
commanding officers were taken in the galliots to the 
Island, named after the castle, facing Gualquini, the 
Penelope having been the first to cross after collecting 
her crew ; the plan was to journey to the interior chan- 
nels over the bars of San Pedro and San Juan to Florida, 
demolishing on the way the forts of Bajeses and San 
Pedro. Orders were consequently given the troops 
to disembark and march two leagues in order to ar- 
rive in front of the castle or fort of Bajeses, and to all 
the small boats to pass through the said channels as soon 
as the tide should permit, in order to cross over the troops 
to the said fort which was situated on another island in 
front; but because the orders were misunderstood, some 
confusion resulted, for some entire pickets and a few scat- 
tered men not having come up with any boats, followed the 
convoy of Casteiaeda. About fifteen hundred men remain- 
ed this night on the island in question. 

The naval commander Don Antonio CastaCeda ordered 
the galley to approach the shore and endeavor, if it could 
do so without exposing its crew, to put its small boat over- 
board for the purpose of spiking the two guns lying on the 
shore and to burn certain houses if it were decided there 
were no enemies in the camp. This was done, for we saw 
them burning, as we did some hostile boats which could 
not be manned. Don Adrian Cantein carried these orders 
out. At the same time this commander made his disposi- 
tions for receiving the enemy, drawing up his strong ves- 
sels in line and withdrawing more to the interior of the 


port those that were unarmed. He had determined to set 
out with the tide on the following day if the weather per- 
mitted, to attack the enemy's ships outside in case they had 
not first come in themselves. At sunset we saw them 
standing for the outside and it was in this state that we 
left the houses of Gualquini at the time of our withdrawal. 

July 24th. 

At 3 :00 in the morning, the troops took up the march and 
continued along the beach until 7 o'clock, when we began to 
make out a few of our vessels, for which reason we halted 
in order to wait for all of them, because now we could see 
that they were at anchor solely to wait for the slight tide. 
At about four of the afternoon a schooner having come up, 
the company of grenadiers of the battalion of Havana went 
on board of her with the Indians in order to cross over to 
the fort of Bajeses which was considered to be abandoned 
by the enemy, so that having taken possession of it, all 
disorder should be prevented, and the place preserved with 
its magazmes until the entire body of troops could be 
brought up, and other directions should be given. At 
about 6 :00 of the evening, the vessels which had been at 
anchor moved up, excepting those of Truxillo, Oyarbidos, 
and Camejo. These, on account of their size, and of the 
stores they had aboard, the last one carrying the guns and 
mortars of the enemy, drew too much water, for which 
reason they were compelled to take up their course out- 
side. This was verified by the adjutant Don Albaro, who 
on account of the anxiety caused by this matter, was sent 
out to determine the reason why the said boats held back. 
He returned with the information that he had seen them 
all put out with the vessels under the command of Don 
Antonio Castafieda, the last one being the packet boat of 
the king, for which reason and because it had seen a few 
hostile people on the beach, it fired a few shots. We began 
to embark the troops, but could not finish because night had, 

July 26th. 

We continued embarking the troops until 6:00 in the 
morning, when they were all on board. We waited at this 
hour until the four galliots, under command of Naval En- 
sign Don Francisco de Pineda, should join the whole col- 
lection of our vessels; and having noticed the absence of 


the remainder of his convoy, we learned that they had with- 
drawn with the troops they had on board to Florida, by an 
order which they had to this purpose from the general and 
which was dispatched in his own launch from Gualquini. 
Proceeding thus to the Fort of Bajeses, we arrived at 8 :00 
in the morning and anchored, and at one and the same time 
all the troops began to go ashore in as good order as was 
permitted by the nature of the ground. We found the fort 
abandoned and containing only a few things, such as a 
four-pounder gun spiked, two swivel guns unspiked, fifty 
handgrenades, six empty jars and number of iron hoops. 
The fort is situated upon an eminence which commands 
the entire beach and has no other fortification than that 
afforded by a dense girdle of lofty and large pines and the 
superiority of its position. Within this enclosure was a 
house of limited accommodation and in an angle an under- 
ground room which appeared to be a powder magazine ; 
about one hundred paces beyond this circle were three 
houses at a short distance one from the other, the largest 
of which, from its construction seemed to be a storehouse ; 
the next one vv^as a stable because it was surrounded by a 
fence inside of which we found fifty to sixty horses. These 
at first we thought we would take on to Florida with us. 
but as we had no means of doing so, an order was given 
that they should be immediately killed in order that our 
enemies might have a taste of the same treatment to which 
they had subjected us in Florida. At this very moment, 
however, this order was suspended until we should begin 
our march. The third house was immediately at the land- 
ing which showed that it was either a tavern or a low eat- 
ing house. Our commanding officers took for their head- 
quarters the house in the fort, leaving the others for the 
other officers. The troops went into camp at a distance 
of about two hundred paces from the fort in an open pine 
grove on level ground and more or less shady on account 
of the thick pines growing there. There seemed to be an 
abundance of water with which the men refreshed them- 
selves ; they managed to resist the scarcity of food from 
which they sufifered on this day until the afternoon, for it 
occurred to some of the men to obtain relief by killing a 
few horses and eating their flesh. In the afternoon an issue 
was ordered of a little rice and of one hard tack apiece 
and at the same time a return was asked of the stores which 
were actually on board in the boats with us. This was 


all the more easy to make from the fact that the stores on 
hand permitted us to subsist for the space of eight days 
and no more, because the boats that carried the reserve 
stores were no longer within reach. This being the state 
of affairs, orders were given to man the boats in propor- 
tion to their burden and naturally the issue of rations fol- 
lowed suit. 

July 27th. 

At 4 :00 of the afternoon we remarked in the direction of 
the entrance of the Bay of Whales, three pirogues and one 
launch or canoe, passing from one side to the other as 
though they were carrying troops ; for which reason Don 
Antonio Arredondo proposed that the galliots should go 
out to stop them, and that the Indians should be put ashore 
to cut off the advance of any people who might be coming 
to the help of those who were in the fort of San Pedro ; for, 
according to the information received from the galliots, it 
was known that the said castle was garrisoned, since it 
had fired on them the night before. But the General would 
not consent to this and therefore this action was not taken, 
but instead the order was given at about 5 :00 in the after- 
noon for the troops to go on board. This operation was 
begun and carried on until three or four pickets had em- 
barked; when the order was suspended and another one 
issued that everybody should march and take up a forma- 
tion near the fort, where we remained all night. 

July 28th. 

At dawn, the pirogues or schooners which had brought 
about the resolution to embark on the day before, again be- 
gan to reconnoiter and for the same cause on this day we 
hastened a fresh embarkation, so that at about 9 :00 o'clock 
we were all on board. At this hour we provided for the 
security of our vessels by the following disposition : the 
sloops and large schooners were to sail outside under the 
orders of Lieutenant Colonel Don Antonio de Salgado ; and 
the galliots, with the remaining vessels and a number of the 
little boats, should proceed by interior channels to the Bar 
of the St. Johns River. With these were to go the Com- 
manding General, Don Francisco Rubiani, and the Chief- 
of-Staff and Engineer-in-Chief, Don Antonio Arredondo, 
because it had been provided in advance that horses from 
Florida should join the detachment at the mouth of the 


St. Johns River and in this way facilitate the return of the 
said gentlemen and officers to the garrison of St. Augustine, 
Florida. The time now having come to separate the ves- 
sels into these two classes, Don Antonio Salgado pointed 
out that inasmuch as his vessels were of no military- 
strength, it would be proper that the galliots should con- 
voy him out beyond the bar of the Bay of Whales but this 
suggestion raised considerable opposition, in which Don 
Antonio Arredondo took the lead, showing over and over 
again what inconvenience this course would cause the 
General, who, his mind now being made up, ordered the 
galliots to proceed to the point mentioned in accordance 
with the plan of embarkation, and that he was only waiting 
on them before setting out himself, and so Don Antonio 
Salgado put out with his convoy and succeeded in crossing 
the bar without having met the hostile vessels, of which 
he was so fearful, and the galliots returned to join the gen- 
tral. The wind fell at half past six and the convoy anchored 
about a league outside the bar. 

July 29th. 

At four o'clock in the morning, we hoisted anchor, the 
land breeze blowing, and at 9 :00 o'clock, found ourselves 
in front of the entrance of the Bar of San Pedro and about 
two leagues ofif ; at 10 :00 having gone about one league more 
from the said mouth and at a distance slightly more than 
three from the fort, we began to hear a few cannon shots 
and remarked that these were answered by a few vessels 
which we could not see because they were hidden by the 
land. The number of rounds rose to more than seventy 
and we heard besides a few discharges of musketry, lasting 
for an hour. We then saw a few boats coming out, which 
from their bearing left no doubt in our minds that they 
were the convoy of our general. Nothing unusual occurred 
in the journey to the Bar of the St. Johns where we 
anchored because the wind had fallen. 

July 30th. 

At 2:00 o'clock in the morning we hoisted anchor with 
the wind fresh from the east-northeast. At noon we found 
out that we had slipped by St. Augustine six leagues and 
were now, thanks to a heavy squall, separated from the 
convoy. The currents too were now carrying us with 
great force to the south, so that it would have caused us 


much effort to return to the said bar. Moreover, it was 
agreed by the captain and officers of this sloop, whose name 
was El Canto, that it was perfectly clear that the weather 
was such as would greatly help us to continue our voyage 
to the Port of Havana. This course, too, would be useful 
to the service of the King, because the general and other 
officers of high rank had been heard to say with respect to 
the remaining vessels that it would be of advantage to 
send them on as rapidly as possible on account of the disad- 
vantage that would result from any other course, because 
St. Augustine with so many people within its limits would 
be called upon to make a great expenditure of stores and 
that it would be impossible to revictual it, considering that 
it would be necessary in the weather prevailing to send 
stores for thirty days. And even if the vessels should find 
it impossible to make the journey, a report would be given 
to the Governor of Havana so that he could himself issue 
the necessary orders in the case. Having considered all 
these things, and the fact that the campaign was over, and 
that we had a sufficiency of stores on board for returning 
the troops with which we had come out, we unanimously 
agreed upon the said resolution of returning straight to 
Havana. On this day we saw a sloop astern following in 
our wake, for which reason we thought it must belong to 
the convoy. 

July 31st. 

At 12 :00 o'clock, noon, we arrived off the Bar of Mosquito 
Inlet and skirting the coast with but little wind, we 
anchored at night because it had fallen calm. 

August 1st. 

At 4:00 o'clock we hoisted anchor, with the wind to the 
east-southeast. Upon its veering to the southeast and 
falling almost a dead calm, we anchored at 6:00 o'clock 
in the afternoon at about six leagues from the Canaveral 

August 2nd. 

At 2:00 o'clock we set out with the wind northeast and 
light. We passed the Canaveral Channel at noon and the 
wind falling, we anchored, having rounded the Real de la 
Almiranta de Chebes and being about two leagues to the 
windward of the River of Ys. 


August 3d. 

At 4:00 we set out with the wind east-northeast and at 
9 :00 o'clock rounded Casacho and anchored at 6 :00 by- 
reason of a calm. 

August 4th. 
At 4:00 o'clock we set out with the wind east-northeast 
and at 12:00 rounded Ropa tendida. At about 6:00 of the 
afternoon the wind shifted to the east-southeast, and so 
stood fresh all night but we made no progress because of 
the force of the currents and so anchored. 

August 5th. 
At 7 :00 we turned the Inlet of Sober and at 6 :00 in the 
afternoon were off Sega, having kept the wind all day east- 
southeast. At 6 :00 o'clock in the morning we descried a 
frigate off our bow at a distance of three leagues, and, like 
us, at anchor through lack of wind. At 11 :00 we hoisted an- 
chor with the wind east-northeast and fresh, and coming 
up at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to within less than one 
league we showed this frigate our colors, confirming it by 
a gun shot, in the belief that she must belong to our con- 
voy because she had followed the same course as we, close 
in shore. It appeared to us to be the little frigate of the 
company commanded by Pablo Rodriguez, but as she 
refused to show us her colors we continued on our voyage, 
leaving her at sunset astern. 

August 6th. 
At dawn, it was calm ; we had not gained more than one 
league during the past night on account of the great 
strength of the currents. We remained at anchor this en- 
tire day and night through lack of wind. We employed a 
part of this day in taking on water from a lagoon close by. 

August 7th. 
The calms and contrary winds continuing we remained 
at anchor this entire day and night. 

August 8th. 
At 3 :00 we hoisted our anchor with the wind east-north- 
east which we kept until night when, because it fell off, we 
anchored at the Banda del S. R. of the Rio Seco, one 


August 9th. 

At 2:00 in the morning we hoisted our anchor with the 
wind northeast and at 6 :00 passed Ratones inlet ; and at 10 
anchored at the inlet to the north of Biscayne Key. 

August 10th. 

At 5 :00 of the morning we hoisted anchor with the wind 
east. We passed Biscayne Key, the Candiles de la Parida, 
the Candiles de las Mascaras, the shoal de las Mdscaras,. 
the first Canaleja of Long Key, the Playuelas, the shoal of 
las Tetas with its inlets, Escribano Key, and anchored near 
Melchior Rodriguez at 10 of the night. 

August 11th. 

At 5:00 o'clock we hoisted anchor with the wind east, 
passed Tabanos Key, the inlets of Guimero, Old Matacumbl 
and Young Matacumbi, Biboras Key, Bascas Key, and at 
10 of the night anchored in Bahia Honda. 

August 12th. 

At 5 we hoisted anchor, wind east; passed Caguamas- 
Point, and Boca chica, and anchored at 4 of the afternoon 
in Key West. 

August 13th. 

We stayed here all day, anchored at night because of 

August 14th. 

Hoisted at 2 of the morning, and anchored about a half 
league out in Key West Channel. Hoisted anchor at 5:30, 
wind N. N. E. and put out through the small channel of 
Key West. Proceeding thus, at 10 the wind shifted to the 
north, at 5 :30 to N. E., at 8 of the morning to E. W. and so 
held until 12 when it veered to the S. S. O. where it held all 
day, our course being S. E. 

August 15th. 

At six we made out the range of Camarioca; when about 
6 leagues to leeward of them, the wind shifted to the E. S. 
E., and with our head to the south, at 5 of the afternoon we 
reached Bacuniaga, 5 leagues to leeward of Matanzas. 


August 16th. 

Dawn found us in Jaruco Inlet, 8 leagues to leeward of 
Havana, in which harbor we anchored at 2 :30 of the after- 

[ End of Casinas' Journal.] 



Sir, — 

I transmit the report herewith, to the end that your Lord- 
ship place it in the hands of the Royal and Supreme Coun- 
cil of these Indies for their information. 

Your Lordship holds me in faithful unalterable affection, 
always at your command, and praying Our Lord to keep 
Your Lordship many years. 

Saint Augustine, in Florida, 3 August, 1742. 

Don Manuel de Montiano, your most obedient servant, 
kisses your Lordship's hand. 


Don Fernando Trivino. 

Letter of Montiano to the King. 
In a letter of October 31st of the past year, Don Jos6 del 
Campillo advised me that Your Majesty had resolved upon 
the formation in Havana of an expedition to lay waste Caro- 
lina and its dependencies, and that he was communicating 
this news to me by command of Your Majesty, to the end 
that I might give Lieutenant General Don Juan Francisco 
de Guemes y Horcasitas, Governor of Havana, all the infor- 
mation that I might have and that might conduce to the 
happy issue of these royal instructions. These, I obeyed 
with all the promptness demanded, and posted the results 
to the aforesaid Lieutenant General Governor of Havana, 
offering myself for any duty in the Royal Service that he 
might see fit to give me. In consequence he informed me 
in a letter of May 14, brought by an officer of that garrison 
[Havana] in a small boat, that he had selected me for the 
command of the expedition, sending me at the same time 
the particular charges and directions for the best advantage 
of Your Majesty's Service. He informed me that the 


expedition was ready to put to sea, and that, although a 
secret council he had called of the senior officers of both 
Services in Havana, as well as of those of the squadron under 
the orders of Lieutenant General Don Rodrigo de Torres, 
had declared impracticable the royal intention and will of 
Your Majesty through lack of sufficient naval forces, yet it 
was agreed that at the right time some operation should 
be set afoot against Georgia, to indemnify us in part for 
the insults and perfidies attempted and committed to the 
injury of these Provinces, and of Your Majesty's indispen- 
sable right to them. 

The convoy of ten small vessels manned by a few mili- 
tiamen and escorted by a galley, sent in advance by the 
aforesaid Lieutenant General, fell in on June 6th with an 
English coastguard man-of-war of 24 guns, which with 
its artillery, launch, and boats, attacked a few of our 
vessels beforementioned. And as our galley could not go 
to the help of all of these, they presently found themselves 
in danger so great, that two of them were compelled to run 
ashore, one of them having lost a lieutenant of artillery and 
a corporal killed, and had a lieutenant of militia wounded. 
One of their boats tried to board a sloop of ours aground, 
but our troops that were on shore began to fire and so 
forced the crew of the English boat to ask for quarter. 
We thus captured one officer and 18 sailors. 

On the 15th of the aforesaid month the entire expedition 
arrived safely of? this bar [that of Saint Augustine] under 
the command of Colonel Don Francisco Rubiani. But on ac- 
count of the scarcity of water, and because of the fierce 
squalls and strong winds which did us some damage, and 
wrecked a launch, drowning a chaplain and some sailors, I 
was unable to leave this port [Saint Augustine] before the 
23rd of the month ; and as on that very day the wind blew 
hard out of the northeast, I delayed my departure until July 
1st, when I put to sea with all the vessels of the Expedition. 
I laid my course for Georgia, and reached its neighborhod 
on the 2d, when a furious storm beyond any human power 
to resist, overtook us from the southwest and scattered 
us all. We remained dispersed many days. The greater 
part of the fleet having reassembled (except 4 galliots, 4 
pirogues, 2 schooners, 2 launches and 1 small boat), we 
.anchored on the 10th in sight of the port of Gualquini, where 
we remained, unable to close in by reason of the contrary 
winds, until the 16th, when we gloriously forced the port, 


with no greater loss than 5 men, against resistance by sea, 
and land in succession. 

At the entrance of the harbor was constructed a fort of 
sod with brick parapets, in the shape of a horseshoe, con- 
taining a bronze shell mortar, and five for smaller shells.* 
It had in its neighborhood a large trench mounting 3 guns 
to sweep the entrance. At a distance of two musket shots, 
and to the west, was another fort, of square trace, with four 
bastions, one in the middle of each curtain, constructed of 
heavy timbers and of earth, and having a ditch one toise** 
and a half wide and four feet deep. On its parapet were a 
few rows of barrels filled with earth, and planted with 
thorns, to serve as a parapet. Along the interior ran a 
stockaded covered way to prevent a surprise, on which 
were mounted 7 guns, 3 of them 18-pounders and six gren- 
ade-mortars. Between the first and this second fort they 
had constructed a strong trench mounting 5 guns: to the 
west of these works was yet another large trench of circular 
form, whose purpose it was to annoy us by musketry. 

Within this harbor between the forts mentioned were sta- 
tioned a 24-gun frigate, a schooner of 14, then a bilander 
of 10 guns. Behind these came a line of eight bilanders and 
schooners well manned to defend the entrance with mus- 
ketry; but in spite of all this, we took possession of the 
Port and anchored at five of the afternoon. 

I immediately gave orders for the disembarkation of the 
entire body, in order to allow the enemy no opportunity to 
recover from the dismay into which our triumph had thrown 
him. This operation was successfully accomplished with- 
out resistance. At dawn, I set out with the entire force, 
my intention being to advance on the first fort. I first 
sent out some Indians to approach and reconnoiter the state 
of affairs and movements of the enemy; these having re- 
turned and reported having seen no one, the Chief of Staff, 
Don Antonio de Arredondo, moved forward to verify the 
information, having with him two companies of Grenadiers 
which I ordered out to ensure the greater thoroughness of 
the reconnaissance, and to determine whether the enemy had 
really retired. When this was confirmed, I continued my 

• Granadas reales, smaller than the bombas, but projectiles of the same 

•• The toesa {ttiesa in MS.), a measure of length about 6.4 feet. 


march to his works which I at once occupied, posting the 
necessary guards, and a few pickets on what appeared to be 
avenues of approach, in order to check any attack they 
might make. 

The Indians and grenadiers brought in two prisoners, 
who confirmed the flight of General Oglethorpe to the town 
of Frederica, distant slightly more than two leagues from 
the forts of Gualquini. Although I might have overtaken 
him, this step did not appear to be prudent, so long as I 
was ignorant of the road and of the ground over which one 
should march with full knowledge. Accordingly, as it 
seemed to me advantageous to advance on Frederica along 
two lines at the same time, I dispatched the captain of one 
of the pickets of this post [Saint Augustine], Don Sebastian 
Sdnchez with 50 men, as being acquainted with these parts, 
to reconnoiter the road leading to the careening ground, at 
which point it seemed to me that it might be more advan- 
tageous to disembark the artillery. 

At the same time I sent the Captain of Miquelets, Don 
Nicholas Herndndez, with 25 of his men and 40 Indians, to 
examine the road that leads directly to Frederica. It fell 
out that Don Sebastian SAnchez lost the trail he was to 
follow, and joined the Hernandez party. These two con- 
tinued as far as the town, in whose vicinity they were 
attacked by a body of English and Indians in a very narrow 
defile of the woods. This accident brought on inevitable 
disorder, in which we suffered the loss of the two captains 
and 11 men captured, 10 men wounded, and 12 killed. 
When news of this reached me, I detached three companies 
of grenadiers to support our troops and cover their re- 
treat; but before the companies of grenadiers could reach 
the site of the action, they were attacked themselves by. 
another ambuscade surrounding a swamp, over which the 
path gave passage only in single file. The Captains of 
•Grenadiers, realizing, if they continued their efforts, that 
no advantage was to be gained save the sacrifice of their 
troops, through the impossibility of seeing who was firing 
on them, or of taking up any formation by reason of the 
nature of the ground, prudently resolved to withdraw in as 
good order as possible, with the loss of Don Miguel Bucareli 
and 6 grenadiers, who were killed. 

The Captain of Miquelets, Don Nicholas Hernandez, tak- 
ing advantage of the fact that he had been very insecurely 
tied by the two soldiers who were taking him along,. 


succeeded in breaking loose, which the soldiers observed ; on 
their endeavoring to make him secure by tying his arms, 
he gave them no chance, for like a man of valor and spirit, 
he rushed upon one of them and took away his sword, and 
with it, its owner's life, and then slew the other, thus earn- 
ing his liberty and returning to our camp four days later. 
This Captain and some of his soldiers, although born woods- 
men (hombres de monte), were so exhausted by the difficul- 
ties of the undei^brush, that they thought they would give 
up the ghost before coming out on the road. 

I now took these matters under serious consideration, as 
well as the report of the Captains of Grenadiers and our 
Indians, to the effect that the forest was impenetrable be- 
cause of its impassable undergrowth, besides being full of 
swamps and lagoons. Furthermore, the representations of 
Don Antonio de la Atora, agent of the Exchequer, in re- 
spect of the consumption of stores, and that those to be 
consumed on our withdrawal should receive first thought, 
there being barely enough in hand to last to the end of 
August, gave me pause. 

The tempestuous weather of August and September was 
also a fact of no mean weight. I was moreover compelled 
to take into account the naval forces then off the coast of 
Carolina, superior to ours. Our prisoners declared that it 
was commonly known that General Oglethorpe was expect- 
ing them. Our delays caused by bad weather, the action 
between the man-of-war and our galley and small convoy, 
and the fact that we had maintained ourselves on his 
coasts, must have convinced the General of our inten- 
tion to attack him, and thus have given him time to prepare 
his defense. The failure of thirteen vessels, among them 
four galliots carrying some troops and all the sappers, to 
rejoin the convoy, had caused us supreme embarrassment, 
for without these men and the row boats, no operation 
was possible ashore or on the rivers within a radius of some- 
what more than two leagues. Lastly, I could not overlook 
the special injunctions of Lieutenant General Don Francisco 
de Guemes y Horcasitas to consider the most important 
matter of assuring the withdrawal of the troops, having re- 
gard to the notable reduction that had taken place in the 
garrisons of both Havana and Saint Augustine. 

Having therefore maturely considered all these matters, I 
called a council of war composed of the senior officers of 
the army, and having laid before them the reasons which 


had led me to assemble then, I asked them to advise what 
we should do in the situation that faced us. They answer- 
ed that there was in their opinion nothing else better than 
to reconnoiter the river leading to the town of Frederica, 
and see if there were not some place where the men and 
artillery could be conveniently disembarked, in order to 
batter the fort and town ; that while this was in hand, the 
vessels could continue taking on water, for it was to be 
recollected that even if favorable terrain could be found 
for the disembarkation, nothing should be undertaken that 
would demand more than six days for its execution. The 
fact that we had supplies for no later than the end of Au- 
gust was of such gravity that we ought to think of nothing 
else but to withdraw to our respective garrisons, and thus 
avoid the dangers threatened by delay. In consequence 
of this advice, the Engineer Don Pedro Ruis de Olano went 
out with the galley and the two galliots to make the recon- 
naissance agreed upon, and got within musket shot of Fred- 
erica, without finding any place suitable to a disembarka- 
tion, because the bank of the river is a marsh throughout 
its length, and overgrown with grass ; he was unable to 
determine whether it was quaking grass or water swamp, 
and it was only within cannon range that he thought there 
might be a clear place where he thought a landing might 
be possible. But on taking into account the well-recogniz- 
ed risk of exposing the men to much loss, especially as he 
had been unable to determine whether there was a battery 
or entrenchment or not, I resolved that it would be disad- 
vantageous to undertake an operation so palpably danger- 
ous. Nevertheless, I withheld my decision so far as to call 
a second council, principally because at dawn of this day 
a deserter came into camp, and declared that General Ogle- 
thorpe had been marching the entire night with 500 men 
to surprise us before dawn. In answer to questions intend- 
ed to inform me as to the condition and forces of Ogle- 
thorpe- he said they numbered one thousand, half of them 
regular troops of his own regiment, and the remainder set- 
tlers and Indians, that the town of Frederica was defended 
by a battery that commanded the river, and mounting small 
guns, some 18-pounders, and mortars of both and large 
calibre; and that on the bank of the river near the town 
there was a trench in which he could place his men under 
cover, and prevent our landing. He continued that another 
channel through which our vessels could easily pass was 


defended by a garrisoned mortar battery. He added that 
the General was placing his chief trust in the thickness of 
the woods and the morasses. He also declared that he 
was expecting both men and ships, that the people of Caro- 
lina would not be long in appearing, likewise Virginians 
and Philadelphians, in as much as he had sent letters in all 
directions by reason of the suspicions excited by the affair 
of the galley and small convoy off Cape Canaveral, and 
confirmed by our long stay on his coasts. 

A few hours after the arrival of the deserter, and just as 
the second council was about to sit, the outposts on the 
shore, and the men in the tops, announced that three cruis- 
ers, one bilander and a schooner were approaching the 
port. This information compelled me to adjourn the coun- 
cil, and to hold one composed only of Colonel Don Fran- 
cisco Rubiani, of Lieutenant Colonel Don Antonio Sal- 
gado, and of the Chief of Staff Don Antonio de Arredon- 
do. These all agreed that we should bend all our ener- 
gies to retreat, that our fear lest Oglethorpe should at- 
tack by land while his ships did the same by sea was 
normal. I consequently ordered that all the troops should 
cross over to the island in front, in order to give our ships 
time to prepare, unencumbered, for the defense; and that 
the smaller vessels should, while I was marching ashore 
with the troops, enter the River of Whales, and await me on 
the bar of the same name, where I intended to embark and 
go on to the capture and demolition of Fort Saint Andrew. 
This was all done ; the fort I found unoccupied, it had one 
gun, a 4-pounder, three stone mortars, a few implements, 
and a number of horses, which we killed. From this point, 
in order to improve the time while the smaller vessels were 
completing the task of bringing up the stores that were 
lacking, I arranged to detach 200 men ashore to occupy 
Fort San Pedro, which the night before had fired on the 
four galliots, launches and pirogues separated from us by 
the storm, and which had now rejoined ; but as I was with- 
out supplies, inasmuch as the vessels that had them on 
board, were going outside straight to Florida, I thought 
the most rapid transportation possible of the troops to 
Saint Augustine, preferable to a delay without provisions. 

I consequently commanded all the vessels to pass out by 
the Bar of Whales, while I with the 4 galliots, launches and 
pirogues took the inside of the river, in order to reconnoiter 
the aforesaid Fort San Pedro, and to attend to anything 


that might come up. This done, and notwithstanding the 
fire which they opened, and which I ordered the 4 galliots 
to return, I continued on my way and reached the River 
Saint John, where I went ashore and thence on August 1st, 
to this fortress [Saint Augustine] where I found all the 
troops carried by the vessels that had gone outside. 

During the time in which I abode in camp at Gualquini, 
notwithstanding the lack of sappers, I took such measures, 
that the troops and militia in detachments destroyed and 
razed the castles [i. e., forts] and batteries; that the artil- 
lery, mortars, and implements were carried aboard; that 
the houses in the country were burned to the number of 
thirty, and the planted fields laid waste; and so finished 
this business on the last day as regards the remainder of 
the settlement, say seventy houses in seven streets, that not 
a sign or vestige remained, to show that the place had ever 
been settled. 

And I did the same sort of thing with the enemy's ves- 
sels, excepting two bilanders, which I manned, and put into 
our armada, and the war ship, which on the very night we 
forced the pass, under favor of the darkness, and of a storm, 
succeeding in escaping, in spite of the efforts of Don 
Antonio Castaneda to prevent its flight. 

I consider that the damage done the English will amount 
to between 250,000 and 300.000 pesos. On the day when 
I went by land to the Island of Vejeces, the land wind that 
was blowing drove off the hostile vessels from the coast, 
and also took ours out, for it was the intention, suggested .by 
me, of Don Antonio de Castaneda, commander of the Fleet, 
to attack the enemy. As he was unable to fmd them how- 
ever, he set his course for Havana. 

All the officers, both senior and junior, of regular troops 
and militia; Don Antonio de Castaneda, and the naval vol- 
unteers, have given proof of special zeal and devotion to 
the service of Your Majesty; and particularly Colonel Don 
Francisco Rubiani, Lieutenant Colonel Don Antonio Saiga- 
do, and the Engineer of the Second Class, Don Antonio de 
Arredondo, who discharged the functions of Chief of Staff 
with incessant toil. For these reasons I recommend them 
to the notice of Your Majesty as worthy of distinction. 

I do pot know, Sir, whether my conduct of affairs will 
meet with the roval approbation of Your Majesty, seeing 
that my entire effort has been to discharge the trust com- 
mitted to my care with no other end than the ruin of the 


enemies of the Crown, and the honor and glory of the arms 
of Your Majesty. These might have been better advanced 
had not the All Powerful, who disposes of all things, brought 
to naught the plan I had in mind, of sending 3 galliots under 
the orders of the Naval Lieutenant Don Adrian Cantein to 
the river of Saint Simon, and two to the river of Whales 
under the command of the Ensign Don Francisco Pineda, 
for the purpose of cutting the enemy's communications and 
prevent succor reaching him from the north, agreeably with 
the instructions of Lieutenant General Don Juan Francisco 
de Guemes y Horcasitas. 

Nevertheless, I expect of the royal magnimity of Your 
Majesty, that it will deign to regard itself as having been 
well served in the operations under question, and that I 
shall have the satisfaction of receiving honors from Your 
Majesty, whose Catholic royal person I pray our Lord to 
preserve as many happy years, as Christendom may need. 
Saint Augustine, in Florida. August 3, 1742. 
Don Manuel de Montiano. 






Orders to be observed by the officers of the troops des- 
tined for the expedition to be undertaken for the expulsion 
of the foreigners that have intruded upon the territories 
of His Majesty in the provinces of Saint Augustine in 
Florida, under command of Colonel Don Juan Bautista de 
Echevarria, appointed as commanding general for its 
duration, in respect not only of regular operations, but also 
of the orderly conduct of the march. 

1. They will obey w^ith the greatest punctuality and ac- 
curacy all and any orders whether written or oral, all apply- 
ing the most particular attention to discipline, and to the 
good condition of the unit committed to their care. When- 
ever the case calls for it, they will display the constancy and 
fortitude, corresponding to their obligations and to the 
honor and glory of the arms of the King. 

2. All the small vessels told off to the expedition which 
is to pass through the channels, will proceed with the troops 
and officers assigned to each under the orders of the com- 
manding general; the total number will be divided into four 
parts or squadrons each with its designated chief. 

3. Whenever the commanding general shall hoist a sig- 
nal, the chiefs of squadrons will at once hoist the same by 
way of answer; as soon as the signal is hauled down, the 
others will follow suit successively, to show that the signal 
has been understood. 

4. When the formation is single line abreast, the post 
of each chief of squadron will be in front of his squadron; 
in forming four lines in four ranks, on the right ; in column 
of four or more abreast, at the head, and on the right, of 
the first file of his squadron ; in forming single line abreast 
with the four squadrons, he will occupy the proper post by 
the side of the last vessel of the squadron he is following, 
keeping the remainder of his vessels on his left flank, all 
of which will proceed to their proper places in succession 
on the flank of their commander, and preserving in all 


movements their place and distance, whether under way, 
at anchor, or moored. 

5. Every commanding officer of a vessel must observe 
with care all the signals whether day or night, made by his 
immediate chief, and included in the list which each for 
better understanding will have with him : he will without 
delay execute the import of said signals. 

6. Each commanding officer of a vessel will divide his 
crew into two watches, which will be on both by day and 
by night; the watch will be relieved every four hours; dog 
watches will be stood between 4 and 8 of the evening, in 
order to share fatigue and rest. Two sentries will be left- 
continuously posted, one in the bow, the other in the stern, 
with orders to keep a sharp lookout in all directions, for 
people ashore, signal fires or boats; they shall carefully ob- 
serve the signals made by their immediate commander, and 
communicate them at once to the sergeant or corporal of 
the guard, and the latter to his officer, for suitable action. 

7. Each commanding officer of a vessel will give severe 
orders to maintain the deepest silence by night and by day, 
and that no one discharge a fire arm without orders ; in no 
case will anyone be allowed to smoke* by night. 

8. Each time that a signal is made to go ashore to cook, 
the master of the vessel will take off only the number ab- 
solutely necessary for the purpose, that is, will detail a num- 
ber sufficient to act as guard. No one else will be allowed 
ashore. As soon as the food is cooked, he will order it 
carried on boaid, in order that all may eat. He will do the 
same in respect of going ashore for water ; and see to it that 
his people do not mingle with those of other boats, and 
that the business in hand shall be carried on as near his 
boat as possible, in order that his people may promptly go 
on board, should necessity require it. 

9. The armed party that goes ashore to act as guard, will 
post itself as strongly as possible covering the watering or 
cooking party, in such a way as to command the approaches 
and so prevent any sudden attack. 

10. Whenever the flagship signals to head inshore and 
disembark for any purpose, each commander of a vessel 
will so order the landing that as it progresses, his men 
shall, if the nature of the ground permit, form four in front 
and three deep ; and if it should not permit, eight or more in 

• Chupar tabaco, a quaint expression, literally to "suck tobacco." 


front, according to circumstances, marching at the same 
time on one line to occupy sufficient ground for the forma- 
tion of the entire body under his orders. This movement 
concluded, he will halt and await orders. 

11. Each commanding officer of a vessel will at dawn 
cause his sails to be furled and remain under bare poles; he 
will send a man aloft to look around for signs or people 
ashore, signal fires or boats; and will communicate his dis- 
coveries by proper signal. 

12. Only the commanding general will fly by day a blue 
pennant, which he will cause to be lowered whenever he 
wishes to make a signal. 

13. Whenever the commanding general shall set a signal 
he will keep it flying until he is satisfied that the squadron 
commanders understand it. This will be signified to him 
by their using the same signal in answer; when the com- 
manding general hauls down his signal, the squadron com- 
manders will do the same, it being understood that no one 
shall fly a flag, unless ordered, or necessary for signalling 
as prearranged. 

14. Whenever the commanding general shall make the 
signal for general disembarkation, each commanding officer 
of a vessel shall at once obey it, leaving on board only two 
soldiers as a guard, and the sailors, ordering them under 
no circumstances to leave the position in which ordered to 
remain. , 

15. Each commander of a vessel on discovering any peo- 
ple ashore, boats, or fires will at once inform his squadron 
commander by suitable signal, and keep his signal up until 
said commander answers by the same : in all cases this pro- 
cedure will indicate that signals have been understood. 

16. Each squadron commander, on receiving a signal 
from any vessel of his squadron, will determine its meaning, 
and then answering with the same, will keep it flying until 
the commanding general shall have made suitable acknowl- 

17. The commanding general on receiving a signal from 
a squadron commander will acknowledge with the same, 
after he has made out the cause, and will give such orders 
as he deems proper. 

18. The commanding general will, whenever the nature 
of the channels to be navigated permit it, adopt the forma- 
tion in column four abreast, or anchor in this order, as best 
lending itself with least confusion to all other maneuvers 


demanded by circumstances. He will order the galliots to 
precede the entire fleet, the other boats to follow in order, 
so as to be on hand for such action as offers. 

19. Each commanding officer of a vessel, besides ob- 
serving orders given, shall constantly maintain himself near 
the flagship, so as to hear promptly whenever hailed by it 
either by voice or speaking trumpet to draw near in order 
to receive orders. These will be at once executed. To this 
end, each commanding officer will take turn on guard; so 
that if nothing material comes up, the captain of the guard- 
boat will at 11 of the morning, the hour at which the orders 
must be given, go on board the flagship to receive the coun- 
tersign and parole, and will then proceed to communicate 
it to all the squadron commanders and captains, so that if 
at night some vessel not of the convoy, or some hostile ves- 
sel should be met, that fact may be recognized by its fail- 
ure to give the countersign and parole when challenged. 
Should this happen and be verified, suitable action will be 
taken. If the guard boat should, when needed, be on duty 
elsewhere, the next boat on the roster will come up when 
hailed by the flagship, so that the commanding general may 
always have some one to distribute any orders he may wish 
to give. 

Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas. 



Havana, March, 1738. 

Signals to be made by night by the Commanding General and obey- 
ed by Commanding Officers of Squadron and Ships. 

A light astern and one in 
the bow. 

Two lights astern. 

Light astern. 

Light in the foretop for the 
first and light in the bow 
for the second. 

Light astern and one in the 

Two lights astern. 

Light astern. 

Light in the foretop for the 
first case, and one in the 
bow for the second. 

1. Hoist anchor and get 
under way forming front 
with the entire fleet. 

2. Hoist anchor and get 
under way each squadron in 
four ranks. 

3. Hoist anchor and get 
under way in column of four 

4. Hoist anchor and sail 
in column, two abreast, or in 
single file, bow and stern. 

5. Anchor with the fleet 
in a single line. 

6. Anchor each squadron 
in four ranks. 

7. Anchor in column, four 

8. Anchor in column, two 
abreast, or in single file, bow 
and stern. 


Light to port and another to 

9. Go ashore and cook. 

The same signal aloft, add- 
ing another light in the 

10. Each man to go aboard 
his ship. 

Light in the main top, anoth- 11. Everybody to go 
er in the foretop and one ashore, 
on the bow. , 

Light in the main top, anoth- 
er in the foretop. 

12. The people of the first 
and second squadrons, and 
no more, to go ashore 
reckoning the command- 
ing general's as the first. 

Light in the foretop 
another in the bow. 

and 13. The people of the sec- 
ond and third squadrons 
to go ashore. 

Light at half mainmast and 
another at half foremast. 

14. People of the third and 
fourth squadrons to go 

Light at half mainmast. 

15. Half the people of each 
boat to go ashore. 

Light at half foremast. 

16. A fourth of the people 
of each boat to go ashore. 

Three gun flashes if to the 
westward and two if to 

17. To give notice that 
there are people or a noise 

To show a light three times 19. To give notice of one or 
at the bow, giving suffi- of many boats, 
cient time between appear- 
ances to allow them to be 
distinctly counted. 



Light in the bow. 

20. Whenever the com- 
manding officer of a vessel 
gives notice that he needs 
something, or reports 
something unforeseen or 
unprovided for aboard his 

Light astern and three gun- 21. To give notice that a 
flashes. hostile ship has been en- 

countered and captured. 

Light astern and four gun 

A swivel-gun shot and a 
light in the main top. 

A light in the main top and 
three rounds from a swiv- 
el-gun shots. 

22. To give news that a 
hostile ship has been en- 
countered and has escap- 

23. All the ships will go to 

24. All the vessels will fire 
their swivel-guns against 
their antagonists whether 
ashore or afloat. 

Light in the main top and 25. All the vessels will open 
three swivel-gun shots. with their swivel-guns 

and small arms. 

It should be noticed that this order deals only with ves- 
sels having the enemy in their front or on their flanks and 
not embarrassed by such others of their own ships as might 
be ahead ; because if it should be impossible, as it may, for 
all our ships to extend their front against the enemy and 
thus perhaps be unable to fire all at the same time- as intend- 
ed by this order, then only those will open that have a clear 
field of fire in front, or are so situated that they can fire 
without embarrassing one another, so that the fire may be 
opportune and useful and all confusion and danger avoided, 
for these could easily occur in our own fleet unless these 
precautions were taken. 

Two lights on the mainmast, 2. To go about whether un- 
one about a yard below the der sail or under oars. 



It should be noticed that this maneuver must be carried 
out so that the vessels of the second file shall go about after 
having occupied the place in which the flagship or its file 
and vanguard went about; the third file will do the same 
where the second went about; the fourth where the third 
and the movement will be carried out in this fashion until 
the rear guard is reached ; one succeeding the other in the 
same order and distance so that after all the vessels shall 
have tacked, the fleet will remain in the same formation as 

Day Signals to be made by the Commanding General and obeyed by 
the Commanding Officers of Squadron and Ships. 

The Spanish ensign in the 
bow and the pennant of 
Spain in the mainmast. 

Ensign of Spain in the bow 
and the same pennant in 
the foretop. 

Standard of Spain in the bow 
and the pennant at half 

1. Hoist anchor and get 
under way forming front 
with the whole fleet. 

2. Hoist anchor and get 
under way in column, four 

3. Hoist anchor and get 
under way in column, four 

Ensign of Spain in the bow 
and the pennant at half 
foremast in the first case; 
and in the second the en- 
sign of Spain in the fore 

Ensign of Spain in the bow 
and pennant of Spain in the 

Ensign of Spain in the bow 
and the same pennant in 
the foretop. 

4. Hoist anchor and get 
under way in column, two 
abreast, or in single file, 
bow to stern. 

5. Anchor in single line of 
the whole fleet. 

6. Anchor, each squadron 
in four ranks. 



Ensign of Spain in the bow 
and the pennant at half 

Ensign of Spain in the bow 
and pennant at half fore- 
mast for the first case ; and 
for the second, ensign of 
Spain in the foretop. 

7. Anchor in column, four 

■i. Anchor in column, two 
abreast, or in single file, 
bow to stern. 

Ensign of Spain in the main- 9. Go ashore to cook, 

Ensign of Spain in stops in 10, Each man to return to 
the bow and blue pennant his ship, 

in the maintop. 

Blue pennant in the foretop. 11. Go ashore for water. 

The same blue pennant at 
half mainmast. 

Ensign of Spain in the bow 
and red pennant in the 

Ensign of Spain in the main- 
top and pennant of Spain 
in the foretop. 

Ensign of Spain in the main- 
top and blue pennant in the 

12. Each man to return to 
his ship. 

13. All ships will display 
their ensigns in the bow. 

14. Everybody ashore. 

Ensign of Spain in the main- 
top and blue pennant in the 

Ensign of Spain in the fore- 
top and Spanish pennant 
in the maintop. 

15. The people of the first 
and second squadrons, and 
no more, to go ashore, 
reckoning the command- 
ing general's as the first; 
the people of the remain- 
ing squadrons not to stir. 

16. The people of the sec- 
ond and third squadrons, 
and no more, to go ashore, 

17. The people of the third 
and fourth squadrons, and 
no more, to go ashore. 


Ensign of Spain at half main- 
mast and Spanish pennant 
at half foremast. 

Ensign of Spain at half main- 

The ensign of Spain in stops 
at the stern and the bow 
set or pointing to the place 
where the people were 
seen, and so kept until the 
flagship answers with the 
same signal which will be, 
when it will have picked 
up the said people. 

Spanish ensign in stops in 
the maintop and the bow 
pointing where fire was 
seen and to remain in this 
fashion until the flagship 
answers wtih the same sig- 

Ensign of Spain in stops in 
the bow, this pointing 
where the ships were seen 
and the said stopped flag 
hoisted and lowered as 
many times as there were 
boats seen, with a suffi- 
cient interval to give op- 
portunity to distinguish 

Ensign of Spain in the bow, 
hoisted and lowered three 
times and the commanding 
officer of the squadron will 
answer in the same way in- 
forming the commanding 
general, who will take the 
proper action. 

18. Half the people of each 
ship, and no more, to go 

19. A quarter of the people 
on each ship, and no more, 

20. To give notice of hav- 
ing seen people ashore. 

21. To give notice of some 
fire ashore. 

22. To give notice of one or 
of many vessels seen. 

23. Whenever the com- 
manding officer of a vessel 
gives notice that he needs 
something or reports some- 
thing unforeseen or unpro- 
vided for aboard his ship. 


Ensign of Spain in the bow 24. All ships whether under 
and red pennant in the sail or at anchor will go to 
foretop. quarters. 

Ensign of Spain in the bow 25. All vessels to open fire 
and the red pennant in the with their swivel-guns on 
maintop. their antagonists whether 

afloat or ashore. 

Ensign of Spain in the bow, 26. All vessels will open fire 

red pennant in the maintop with their swivel-guns and 

and another Spanish pen- muskets at one and the 

nant in the foretop. same time. 

It should be noticed that this order deals only with ves- 
sels having the enemy in their front or on their flanks and 
not embarrassed by such others of their own ships as might 
be ahead; because if it should be impossible, as it may, for 
all our ships to extend their front against the enemy and 
thus perhaps be unable to fire all at the same time, as in- 
tended by this order, then only those will open that have 
a clear field of fire in front, or are so situated that they 
can fire without embarrassing one another, so that the fire 
may be opportune and useful and all confusion and danger 
avoided, for these could easily occur in our own fleet unless 
these precautions were taken. 

Spanish pennant in the main- 27. To go about whether 
top. under sail or under oars. 

It should be noticed that this maneuver must be carried 
out so that the vessels of the second file shall go about after 
having occupied the place in which the flagship or its file 
and vanguard went about; the third file will do the same 
where the second went about ; the fourth where the third ; 
and the movement will be carried out in this fashion until 
the rear guard is reached; one succeeding the other in the 
same order and distance so that after all the vessels shall 
have tacked, the fleet will remain in the same formation 
as before. 


Day and Night Signals which the Commanding General of the Ex- 
pedition will Order to be made on the Coast and in the Places 
Indicated, to Maintain the Union and Co-operation Required 
and Provided for in the Instructions on the Journey and During 
the Operations of Both Fleets. 

A fire on the beach. 

1. In order that the com- 
manding officer of the sea 
squadron may know where 
the interior flotilla happens 
to be, let him either lie-to 
or anchor. 

Two fires on the beach, a 
quarter of a mile apart. 

2. The said commanding 
officer will put to sea and 
continue his voyage. 

One fire in the place indicat- 
ed and eight or ten flashes 
of powder at intervals. 

3. Order the disembarka- 
tion of the troops designat- 
ed upon the beach of the 
Island of St. Simon, get 
under way and capture the 
port of Gualquini, accord- 
ing to previous instruct- 

Two fires on the same beach 
already mentioned, the 
same flashes and a few 
musket shots at the same 

4. Order the disembarka- 
tion of the troops on the 
beach of the said island, 
get under way, capture the 
port as soon as this signal 
is received, without wait- 
ing for any other. 


Three fires on the beach at 5. The armed bilanders to 
a distance of a quarter of get under way, enter the 
a mile, one from the other. Bay of St. Simon so as to 

co-operate with the disem- 
barkation of the troops, 
told off for this purpose, 
on the beach of the south 
point; the ships to remain 
at anchor outside, as al- 
ready decided. 

Signals of Recognition by Day or Night. 

Whenever the commanding general sends a boat or 
launch to speak to the commanding officer of the sea squad- 
ron, if it should be day, he will carry a Spanish flag in his 
bow and fire a blank cartridge from his swivel-gun. To 
this, answer will be made with a Spanish flag in the stern, 
by clewing up the mainsail and foresail, lowering and hoist- 
ing the main topsails, and by bracing the foretopsail, lying- 
to and waiting. If it should be night, he will show a light 
in his bow and fire three blank rounds from a swivel-gun 
and the answering signal will be a light in the stern, another 
in the bow, and lying-to to wait. 

Whenever the commanding officer of the sea squadron 
shall send a boat or launch to speak to the commanding gen- 
eral- if it be day, he will carry the Spanish ensign in his 
bow and when near enough, will fire five musket shots. 
The answering signal will be to lower the distinguishing 
pennant, to place the ensign in the bow and five mus- 
ket shots. If it be by night, he will show a light in his 
bow, and challenged "Who goes there?" will answer "Phil- 
lip the Fifth and Havana." The answering signal will be 
a light in the stern, and as many other musket rounds, and 
on receiving the same challenge, the answer, "Spain and 


By Otis Ashmore. 

The battle in which Oglethorpe defeated Montiano on 
St. Simon's Island is known locally as the Battle of Bloody 
Marsh and the exact site of this engagement has long been 
in much doubt. 

In the summer of 1912, accompanied by Lawton B. 
Evans, C. B. Gibson, Col. Charles M. Snelling, and L. B. 
Robeson, I made a visit to St. Simon Island for the pur- 
pose of identifying if possible the exact location of the 
battlefield. Every account of the battle had been carefully 
studied, including that of Montiano himself, from transla- 
tions furnished by Lieut. Col. C. DeW. Willcox, U. S. A., 
professor at the United States Military Academy. 

In the light of all these accounts, and after going over the 
ground very carefully, there seems to be no doubt that this 
memorable battle was fought at a point upon the margin 
of the marsh about two miles from the south end of the 
island, and about one mile from the hotel, where the road 
from Gascoigne's Bluff enters the road to Frederica. This 
spot agrees perfectly with the account of Capt Thomas 
Spalding,* which for many obvious reasons is by far the 
clearest and the most trustworthy. A sketch of the island 
and of the battle ground itself, made at the time of my 
visit, will make more clear Spalding's graphic account, and 
will show all the stragetic points in the campaign more 
satisfactorily than any verbal description could do. 

It is, perhaps, needless to say that with the exception 
of the causeway, which still exists, and the crescent shaped 
woodland so well described by Spalding, not a vestige of 
this tragic episode remains. No trace of the road around 
the crescent could be found, as this circuitous pathway has 
long since been abandoned for the more direct road across it. 

• See account of this battle by Capt. Thomas Spalding In Vol. I. Ga. 
Hist. Society Collections. 

i: i 

^ -.* >^ 

i*" . jauoo D *Y 


JBA-rrte CcRo^wD orBwooy H^arsw 

St. Simons Island and Frederica 


The traditions of the people living upon the island all 
agree that the marsh just east of the causeway is the true 
battle ground of Bloody Marsh. 

There is scarcely a doubt that the ambuscade was laid 
at the two points of the crescent woodland where the road 
from Gascoigne's Blufif enters the main road to Frederica, 
and that the Spaniards were entrapped in the curved 
roadway around this crescent. In their confusion the 
Spaniards attempted to retreat along the road over the 
causeway, but when they were met by the claymores of the 
Highlanders, they were forced into the marsh just east 
of the causeway where much of the execution took place. 



Preface 3 

Affidavit of. Juan Castelnau, a prisoner in Georgia.... 7 

Letter of Montiano to the King- 16 

The King orders the dispatch of an expedition against 

Georgia 20 

Montiano acknowledges the receipt of orders for the 

expedition 25 

The Governor General of Cuba gives the Governor of 

Florida information with respect to the expedition 27 
The Governor General of Cuba appoints Montiano to 

the command of the expedition and gives orders. . 32 

Orders to the Commanding Officer of the Fleet 39 

The Governor General of Cuba reports the failure of 

the expedition and sends journals of events 48 

Arredondo's Journal 52 

Casinas's Journal 65 

Montiano's own report 88 

Orders for an expedition against the English 97 

List of signals, etc., for the expedition against Georgia 101 
Return of the troops, crews and stores, ship by ship, 

facing 108 

Note on the Battle Ground of Bloody Marsh 110 

Return of ships, troops and stores of the expedition 

facing 112 


Portrait of Oglethorpe Frontispiece 

Map of the Atlantic Coast from St. Augustine 

to Charleston facing page 7 

De Brahm's Plans, Sections and Elevations 

of Works projected for the Colony of 

Georgia facing page 11 

Illustrations of Spanish Guns pages 36-38 

Map of Jekyll Sound facing page 66 

Arredondo's jNIap of the Entrance to Gual- 

quini facing page 71 

Plan of Fort Saint Andrew facing page 94 

Map of St Simon and Frederica facing page 110